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.ABSTRACT 
Since the Canada-United States Automobile Agreement came 
into effect in 1965 there has been relatively little scholarly 
comment on it. This is surprising in view of the attention which 
has been given to other bilateral treaties between the two 
countries and in view of the effect that the treaty has had on the 
operation of the automobile industry in both countries. In fact, 
to the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first study 
which has examined the Automobile Agreement from a political point 
of view. 
The Agreement came into effect at a time of political 
re-evaluation in Canada. The Canadian government and the Canadian 
people had begun, by 1965» to examine more carefully than ever 
before the nature and the implications of the economic ties which 
existed between Canada and the United States. Those Canadians who 
were opposed to the Automobile Agreement in 19&5 found that their 
arguments were overshadowed by the assertions of those presenting 
the economic advantages which would presumably come about as a 
result of the Agreement. 
The Automobile Agreement has been in effect for eight years 
and there are now several groups in both countries which are calling 
for the abrogation of the Agreement. These groups include some 
Canadian automotive parts manufacturers and a radical wing of the 
ii 
Canadian branch of the United Automobile Workers. In the United 
States several prominent Senators and executive officials from the 
Johnson and Nixon administrations oppose the Agreement. It should 
be noted that each of these groups opposes the Agreement for its 
own set of reasons. 
Given the nature of the opposition one might have expected 
some alterations in the original Agreement. The evidence suggests 
that this has not occurred due to the support which the Agreement, 
in its present form, has received from the major automobile 
manufacturers in Canada and the United States and from each of the 
national political parties in Canada. 
The purpose of this study, then, is to examine whether or 
not the Automobile Agreement is in the long term interest of Canada's 
political nationality and whether or not the Agreement facilitates 
the development of a distinctly Canadian industrial strategy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are wide differences of opinion about the usefulness 
of the Auto Agreement on both sides of the Canada-United states 
border. On the one hand there are those who claim that the Canadian 
automobile consumer can only benefit "by our continental system of ^ 
vehicle assembly" which has been partially brought about by the Auto 
Pact. On the other hand there are those who suggest that the Auto 
Pact represents the sale of Canada's "economic birthright", and 
that when such a sale is achieved it is then impossible to "retain , v 
your political birthright". There is some truth in each statement. 
My own view is that an understanding of the Auto Pact is crucial to 
understanding Canadian-American relations. Indeed, such an understanding 
may well be crucial to understanding the future of Canada, both politi-
cally and economically. 
The Automobile Agreement has brought about economic benefits 
for the automobile manufacturers and has brought about an increase in 
employment in the automobile industry in this country, but there is 
"""K.E. ocott, "Ford Chief Answers $ 50 million Gift Talk", 
Globe and Mail, May 10, 19&9. 
2 
A.D. Hales M.P., "Flashback to 1911", Hamilton Spectator, 




little evidence to suggest that these benefits have been passed along, 
even indirectly, to the automobile consumer. Furthermore, the Auto-
mobile Agreement, in itself, does not represent the sale of Canada's 
economic or political birthright, but the integration of the Canadian 
and United States automobile industries brought about by the Agreement 
does undermine Canada's political nationality. 
It is my position that the Automobile Agreement is an inferior 
response by the Canadian government to an area of significant stress 
on the political system, namely: the concern of many Canadians about 
the implications of massive direct investment in this country coming 
from the United States. My concern about the external control of the 
Canadian economy is based more on political than economic arguments. 
The Automobile Agreement is significant, not so much because it 
encourages rationalization of direct investment in Canada, but rather 
because the Agreement is a precedent which may possibly inhibit the 
Canadian government in devising and implementing economic policies 
aimed at achieving Canadian political interests. 
These political interests include the promotion of east-west 
ties of commerce and culture, as opposed to north-south ties 
promoted by the Automobile Agreement, which tend to erode Canada's 
national identity; distinctive Canadian international trade and 
foreign relations; distinctive Canadian wage and social security 
policies and independent tax and monetary policies designed to 
achieve national objectives. 
Furthermore, the Canadian economy and Canadian trade is] 
coming more and more to be founded on secondary manufacturing i 
3 
industries rather than on primary resource industries. As this 
process continues, It seems likely that various manufacturing sectors 
in Canada will have to be rationalized as part of an overall indust-
rial strategy which provides for higher levels of employment of 
Canadian resources, including maximum development of Canadian entre-
preneurial talent and Canada's human resources. The Canadian govern-
ment has a fundamental political role to play in the development of 
such an industrial strategy. 
An industrial strategy which safeguards the existence of a 
distinctive Canadian nationality should include the following 
objectives: the development of Canadian management skills required 
to manage large business complexes at the international policy level; 
the promotion of Canadian participation in ownership of all segments 
of Canadian business; the removal of the limitations on the exports 
of Canadian subsidiaries so as to develop Canadian expertise in the 
export area specifically, and in the international business area 
generally, and the encouragement of higher levels of research and 
development in Canadian industry so as to increase substantially the 
employment of Canadian scientific engineering, and technical support 
personnel in Canada. 
I submit that the Automobile Agreement undermines these 
political interests and the development of the kind of industrial 
strategy mentioned above. The Automobile Agreement encourages the 
rationalization of the automobile industry in Canada on a continental 
basis and so places the Canadian government in the position of only 
Canada, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 
Canada Year Book, Trade Value of Commodity (Ottawa, 197D, P- lOVj. 
4 
being able to maintain, through the production safeguards, the growth 
of the automobile industry in Canada, rather than placing the govern-
ment in a position to influence and encourage the growth and develop-
ment of the automobile industry, not only in this country, but also 
in the international marketplace. The Canadian government must not 
only be able to introduce legislation to encourage the political 
interests and industrial strategy, which I have mentioned already, but 
also the government must ensure that whatever policies it implements, 
in either of these essential areas, can and will be carried out. 
Bilateral trade arrangements such as the Canada-United States 
Automobile Agreement represent a movement away from both the political 
interests and the industrial strategy mentioned above, which are in 
the long terra interest of the Canadian nation. The degree of movement 
away from these priorities in the specific case of the automobile 
industry is difficult to gauge, but it is my intention to demonstrate 
that the Automobile Agreement denies Canadians the freedom to set 
their own priorities by denying the validity of the non-economic 
motivations in Canada's political interest and industrial strategy. 
The Automobile Agreement provided the conditions for duty-
 x 
— — • — — — . p. t 
free trariehpt.wpFm the- two countries in most new vehicles and parts v^ 
to be used as original equipment. The agreement was similar to other 
bilateral trade arrangements between Canada and the United States, 
such as the Defence Production Sharing Agreement of 1959« in that it 
5 
See the Appendix, for the formal text of the Automobile 
Agreement. It should be noted that specialty items such as tubes, 
tires, and automatic transmissions were excluded from duty free 
treatment. 
>1 " 
included a provision to allow either party to abrogate the pact after 
a twelve-rnonth notification. It is the corollary conditions, 
imposed by both countries, which have precipitated profound political 
effects not only in the Canadian domestic context, but also in the 
bilateral relations between Canada and the United States. 
Canada established conditions in the Agreement which were 
7 
designed to influence the pattern of Canadian automotive production. 
Under these conditions Canada accorded duty-free trade arrangements 
only to manufacturers who met specific conditions. The first of these 
conditions was that to qualify as a manufacturer, the ratio of a manu-
facturer's vehicle sales to production must be at least seventy-five 
percent, using an arbitrarily established "base year", which ran from 
August 1, 1963 to July Jl, 1964. The purpose of this condition was 
9 
to ensure continued production growth in Canada. 
One further commitment *hich the Canadian government required 
of the automobile manufacturers in this country was in the form of 
the "letters of undertaking". These "letters" committed manufacturers 
to increase their value-added by an amount equal to sixty percent of 
See the Appendix, for the formal text of the Automobile 
Agreement, 
7 
See the Appendix: Annex "A". 
c 
To achieve duty free treatment under the terms of the Agree-
ment, only a firm which achieved a ratio of Canadian vehicle production 
to vehicle sales in Canada during each model year of at least seventy-
five percent qualifies as a "manufacturer". 
9 
This was confirmed by D.S. Wood, (who, in 19&!?, *as president 
(of the Canadian Auto Parts Manufacturers Association) in a Memorandum 
from the President to the Auto Parts Manufacturers Association (Canada), 
May 1^ +, I965. The memorandum was obtained from the files of 
A.D. Hales M.P. 
the growth of net sales in cars and fifty percent in commercial 
vehicles. Also included was a commitment by the Canadian manu-
facturers to increase their purchases and production in Canada by 
a specific dollar amount which was divided as follows: General 
Motors | 121 million; Ford ft 7h million; Chrysler ft 33 million; 
American Motors ft 11 million; and all others ft 21 million. The 
obligations set forth in these "letters" were to be fulfilled by 
the end of the 1968 model year. By the end of 1968, all of the auto-
mobile manufacturers in Canada had met the conditions of increasing 
their rates of Canadian value-added according to their increases in 
net sales and spent the amount required of them on increased purchases 
and production. The first two conditions remain in effect at this 
time. 
The only United States restriction was that imports from 
Canada must have fifty percent North American content to qualify as 
duty free. This restriction was included to prohibit import entries 
12 
from third countries. There was no American requirement that 
importers be manufacturers only, indeed, any United States citizen, 
private or corporate, was permitted to import automotive products 
duty free, with the exception of the condition mentioned above. 
In addition to the production-sales requirement, a 
"manufacturer", in order to achieve duty free treatment, must produce 
vehicles which have Canadian content, or value-added, at no less than 
the absolute dollar amount of Canadian content achieved in the 1964 
model year. 
Interview with Bert Barr of the Department of Industry, 
Trade and Commerce, August 3i 1972. 
12 
C.E. Beigie, The Canada-U.S. Automotive Agreement, An 
Evaluation ('''ontreal, 1970), pp. V?-50. 
Because of this rebtriction on imports from third countries, the 
United States was obliged to apply for a waiver from the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) which it subsequently 
received. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade requires 
countries which have signed the General Agreement to reduce duties 
on certain imports from all countries, in return for concessions 
from other potential importers. If tne American government had 
not received the waiver from G.A.T.T., the Automobile Agreement 
would have been a violation of the most-favoured-nation principle 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs- and Trade previously signed by 
the United States. Canada, on the other hand, had no need for 
making any similar provision since all automobile imports into 
Canada were accorded duty free treatment as long as these imports 
were carried out by a manufacturer meeting the two conditions already 
mentioned. 
Since the end of the Second World *ar, Canada and the United 
States have developed compatible policies, particularly in their 
economic and trade relationships. Some Canadians have begun to 
decry this phenomenon during the last ten years; they fear that 
integrated economic and trade relations with the United States leads 
ultimately to the loss of Canadian political sovereignty. The Auto-
mobile Agreement has encouraged and to some extent facilitated the 
establishment of a North American automobile industry. The Automobile 
Agreement does not, in itself, represent a step toward the loss of 
Canadian political sovereignty. There is no question that the 
Canadian government has the authority to pass any law it sees fit 
7 
8 
which would affect the automobile industry in this country. There may 
be a question, however, as to whether such laws affecting the automobile 
industry can be enforced and whether this process is helped or hindered 
by the Automobile Agreement. It is my intention in this analysis of 
the political significance of the Agreement, to shed some light on these 
questions. 
I propose to examine the Automobile Agreement in the following 
sequence: an historical analysis of the automobile industry in Canada 
prior to 1965; an examination of the automobile industry's assessment 
of the Agreement; the United States political assessment of the Agree-
ment; the Canadian political assessment of the Agreement; and an 
investigation of some political implications of the Agreement. 
The second chapter includes a description of the automobile 
industry prior to the signing of the Automobile Agreement in 19651 
and of the political attempts made by the Canadian government prior to 
1965 to revitalize and expand the Canadian automobile industry. The 
chapter dealing with the automobile industry's assessment considers the 
influence that the industry had on the Canadian government during the 
political planning process which culminated in the Canadian proposals 
to the United States for a bilateral automobile trading agreement. 
This chapter also illustrates the initial and continuing support of the 
automobile manufacturers for and the automobile parts manufacturers 
reservations about the Automobile Agreement, and an examination of the 
United Auto Workers Union position with regard to the Agreement. The 
chapter on the United States political perception of the Agreement 
deals with reasons for the opposition of a number of United States 
Senators and some executive officials to the Automobile Agreement. 
9 
The chapter dealing with the Canadian political perception of the 
Agreement examines the reasons why the Agreement is considered to be 
successful by many public figures and most public servants. Further, 
this chapter examines some of the recent indirect pressure which has 
been exerted by the United States to have the Agreement changed. 
The chapter on the political implications of the Agreement reviews 
the political decisions made by the Canadian government concerning 
the ratification of the treaty in Canada. Further, I examine in this 
chapter, the political effects the Automobile Agreement has had on the 
general relationship between Canada and the United States and the 
specific effect the Agreement has had and will likely have on the 
trading relations between the two countries. Finally, the conclusion 
will present this writer's judgments based on the preceding chapters. 
Primary source material was the basis of my research to the 
fullest extent possible. I made extensive use of interviews while 
collecting research material. Respondents were participants in the 
negotiations and were candid in their discussion of the Automobile 
Agreement. I was particularly fortunate to obtain interviews with 
Donald Thom, who is now an Assistant Deputy Minister in the Department 
of Finance and with Bert Barr, who is an officer of the Automotive 
Division of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce. Mr. Thom, 
who was than an Assistant Deputy Minister in the Industry Department, 
along with Simon Riesman, who was then Deputy Minister of Industry 
and C.M.Drury, Minister of Industry in the federal Liberal govern-
ment were primarily responsible for drawing up the Canadian proposals 
for an Automobile Agreement in 1965 and they subsequently led the 
Canadian negotiating team in its discussions with the Americans, 
10 
which came to fruition in the form of the Automobile Agreement. 
Mr. Thorn was very forthright, perhaps because he is no longer 
directly involved with the Automobile Agreement. 
The American negotiating team was headed by Luther Hodges, 
Secretary of Commerce, and by Henry Dempsey, Director of the Trade 
13 Initiative Division of the Department of Commerce. It is 
interesting to note that the negotiation of the Automobile Agreement 
was the last official act performed by these men. They were 
replaced by John O'Connor and Robert McNeil on January 18, 19&5* 
two days after the official signing of the Agreement. Mr. Hodges 
and Mr. Dempsey knew that they would be leaving their respective 
posts prior to January l8, 1965 so the Automobile Agreement was not 
the reason for their departure. There is no evidence that Mr. Hodges 
or Mr. Dempsey were less expert in the negotiations than their 
Canadian counterparts, but at the same time, the American delegates 
knew that they would not be officially answerable for the Automobile 
Agreement after its ratification, and therefore might have been less 
vigilant than they might normally have been if they were going to 
continue in office. 
Mr. Barr has worked on the day to day operation of the 
Automobile Agreement since 1967 and his comments were detailed. 
Other interviews conducted with Hugh Beechey of General 
Motors and Joel Shelley of Ford were interesting because both men 
held not only roughly equivalent positions in the two companies, 
13 
Interview with D.C. Thorn, of the Department of Finance, 
August 3, 1971. 
11 
both are attached to the Public Relations Department of their 
respective companies, but also held basically similar views about 
the Automobile Agreement. Arnold Wallace, who at the time of the 
interview was Vice-President of Earl fiobinson Auto Parts of Oshawa, 
was rather bitter about the effect the Automobile Agreement has had 
on his company in particular, and the automotive parts industry 
generally in Canada. 1 interviewed Mr. 'Wallace because of his 
position in the automotive parts industry in Canada and because 
I had been made aware that Mr. Wallace was dissatisfied with the 
results of the Agreement as they affect his company. His distaste 
for the Agreement contrasted sharply with the views of Mr. Beechey 
and Mr. Shelley who both felt that the Agreement was a boon to the 
automobile industry in Canada. 
A.D. Hales, Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament, 
added a dissenting voice to the discussion concerning the Agreement. 
As the most vocal critic of the Agreement at the time that it was 
announced in 1965» Mr. hales' reflections were important for this 
study. Another key source of primary material was the six volume 
file on the Automobile Agreement which Mr. hales has collected. 
Mr. iiales allowed me access to the file, which included material that 
he had received confidentially, as well as material he had presented 
to the Progressive Conservative Caucus as the party's chief critic 
of the Agreement. I cannot overrate the usefulness of that material 
in the preparation of this thesis. 
I used the secondary material, for the most part, to fill in 
such gaps as were left through my use of primary material C.E. Beigie, 
12 
who is an international economist with the Irving Trust Company of 
New York City, in his book, The Canada-U.S. Automative Agreement; 
An Evaluation, provides the best general economic analysis of the 
Agreement. The report of the Standing Committee on Commerce of the 
House of Commons, Automotive Products, describes the potential economic 
benefits that were anticipated by the government in 196^. The Hearings 
of the Committee on Finance of the United states Senate on the Auto-
mobile Agreement give an insight to the nature of the opposition of 
some American Senators to the Agreement. These documents, particularly, 
were valuable as a complement to the primary material. 
The research methods which I used caused some difficulty in 
two respects. First, the interview technique was difficult, in that 
there seemed to be a tendency on the part of the people interviewed 
to tell me what they thought 1 wanted to hear. 1 feel 1 overcame 
this problem to some extent by asking several different kinds of 
questions on the same topic. Second, I encountered some difficulty 
in my research methods in that virtually all of the studies that 
have been done on the Automobile Agreement have been from an economic 
perspective. In choosing to examine the Automobile Agreement 
according to its political implications, I was confronted with the 
advantage of having great latitude to collect and interpret research 
material on the one hand, and the disadvantage of having no comparable 
studies to examine on the other hand. 
•CHAPTER I 
THE POLITICAL ADVENT OF THE AUTOMOBILE AGREEMENT 
To gain a better understanding of the Canada-United States 
Automobile Agreement of 1965* it is necessary to examine the nature 
of the automobile industry in Canada and the background events which 
immediately preceded the signing of the Automobile Agreement by 
Prime Minister Pearson and President Johnson in Johnson City, Texas, 
on January 16, 1965* 
Neither before 1965, a n d certainly not after that date, has 
the Canadian automobile industry been autonomous. This fact must be 
stated unequivocably and its implications understood. The automobile 
industry in Canada constitutes a classic example of United States 
direct investment in this country. By direct investment 1 refer, 
according to A.E. Safarian's definition to, "a business operation 
incorporated in Canada in which effective control of that operation's 
voting stock is held by non-residents." In the case of the automobile 
industry effective control is held to the extent of ninety-seven 
2 
percent by non-residents, i.e. United States residents. What are 
the implications for Canada as the host for an industry which has 
been completely foreign controlled for decades? 
A.E. Safarian, Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industries 
(Toronto, 1966), p. 2. 
2 
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Balance of Inter-
national Payments 196?T 196**, 196$ (Ottawa, August 19&7) i P« 128. 
13 
Ik 
In the first place Canada can expect only a very limited I 
development of her managerial resources since real control is held I 
in Detroit, not in Oshawa arid Oakville. Thus decisions which affect 
the automobile industry in Canada are international in'the sense 
that they are taken in the interest of the automobile industry 
generally and have little to do with Canada's interest. The auto-
mobile industry in Canada is headed by officers whose decisions fulfill 
a managerial rather than an entrepreneurial function and which follow 
general guidelines established in the United states'. 
The Automobile Agreement accentuates the managerial function 
of Canadian automobile executives as opposed to the entrepreneurial 
function and so undermines the potential of the Canadian government 
to promote the development of Canadian management skills for large 
businesses at an international level. As a result of the Automobile 
Agreement production decisions have been removed from the prerogatives 
of Canadian managers. For example, Ford of Canada has had no senior 
executive in charge of production in Canada since 1965• Another 
result of the Agreement is that Ford of Canada plant managers report 
5 
functionally to their parent corporate officers in Dearborn, Michigan. 
Similarly, as a result of the Automobile Agreement the elimination of 
a number of managerial positions at Ford of Canada has been brought 
about, with the responsibility of these positions going to officers 
See A.E. Safarian, op.cit., pp. 50-88. 
k 
I.A. Litvak, Dual Loyalty: Canadian-U.S. Business 
Arrangements (Toronto, 1971), p. 152. 
5lbid. 
15 
of the parent company in Michigan. 
A second implication, which is not directly related to the 
Automobile Agreement is that the automobile industry in Canada, 
because of its subsidiary nature, has a relatively limited export 
franchise so that the Canadian subsidiary will not compete with its 
7 
United States parent in third countries. Following this formula, 
Ford of Canada may export its products to all Commonwealth countries 
except the United Kingdom which is reserved for the parent company 
in the United States as is the rest of the world except those areas 
which may be delegated to a subsidiary in yet another country by the 
United States parent. Obviously such a policy makes good corporate 
c 
sense; however, it is just as obvious that Canadian freedom of 
trade is at least undermined, not in the formulation stage but in 
the implementation stage, because of the control of the Canadian 
subsidiary by the American parent. For example, there was the case 
of Ford of Canada's hesitation to export trucks to the Peoples 
Republic of China in 1957 because this might have contravened the 
United States "Trading with the Enemy Act". In this instance not 
only was Canada's freedom to trade subject to serious reservations 
but also her sovereignty over her own foreign policy restricted, again 
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 152. 
n 
A.E. Safarian, op.cit. , pp. 103-1*+^ . 
Q 
Interview with Joel Shelley of Ford of Canada (Oshawa, 
July t>, 1971). In Mr. Shelley's words, "It wouldn't make much 
sense to compete against ourselves." 
16 
not in its formulation stages but in its implementation phase. In the 
typical cases mentioned above the problems arose basically because of 
the wholly-owned-subsidiary nature of the automobile industry in 
Q 
Canada. 
An important feature of the "Trading with the Enemy Act" is 
its anticipatory nature. There are not many instances in fact of 
this type of restriction because Canadian subsidiaries of United States 
parent corporations do not explore those export possibilities which 
might bring about a negative United States government reaction if 
these possibilities were to be pursued. 
The Automobile Agreement reinforces the restrictions 
mentioned above. At the same time the Agreement, by reinforcing 
trade restrictions on Canadian subsidiaries, limits the development 
of an industrial strategy by the government which maximizes the 
development of Canadian entrepreneurship through the removal of 
export limitations on Canadian subsidiary business operations. 
Thirdly, as a wholly-owned subsidiary operation, Ford of 
Canada leaves virtually all of the research and development to its 
foreign-owned parent. Certainly the lack of research and develop-
ment facilities is not unique to the automotive industry in Canada, 
indeed the lack of such facilities tends to be a common result of 
foreign direct investment in Canada. In the automobile industry 
o 
cf. A.E. Safarian, op.cit., p. lkk and Canada, House of 
Commons, Debates (Ottawa, December 18, 1957), p« 251^ +. 
See I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 69. 
See A.E. Safarian, op.cit., pp. 168-200. 
17 
the lack of research and development facilities in Canada perpetuates 
the reliance of the Canadian subsidiary on its United States parent 
while the technical and financial benefits which result from research 
and development accrue almost totally to the United States economy. 
A.E. Safarian, for example, points out that where the products of 
the subsidiary and the affiliate are generally identical, such as 
in the automobile industry, only one subsidiary firm in four does 
any research at all. 
Ford, for example, employs all its Canadian research and 
development staff in Dearborn, Michigan. Ford employs no research 
12 
and development staff in Canada. The Automobile Agreement has 
perpetuated this phenomenon in Canada* As a result of the Agreement, 
Ford of Canada rationalized its production in Canada but "no research 
and development unit was established in Canada to service the product 
13 line on which specialization took place in Canada" since this need 
could be met from resources in the United states. The point is that 
the Automobile Agreement undermines the achievement of higher levels} 
of research and development in Canada which allow for the increased j 
Y 
development of scientific, engineering, and technical personnel as { i 
part of an overalll industrial strategy. The Canadian government 
cannot make the best use of this country's human resources if it 
pursues policies such as the Automobile Agreement which undercuts the 
potential for these Canadians to work on research and development in 
their own country. 
12 
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 69. 
15lbid., p. 152. 
18 
Finally, the financial policies of the automobile industry j/ 
in Canada fail within the overall requirements of the parent United 
States companies. In the automobile industry in Canada these policies{ 
i 
have meant, for example, that the subsidiary operations in Canada are ' 
often required to buy parts and services from its United Stated-based 
parent even when other sources may exist in Canada. Direct empirical 
evidence is limited on this point due in large part to the very large 
size of the automobile industry. Mr. Beechey, of General Motors of 
Canada pointed out that often the Canadian operation buys parts and 
services jointly with its parent firm although these parts and 
Ik 
services will be used exclusively by the Canadian plant. A.E. 
Safarian maintains that purchases from the parent company increase 
in proportion to the similarity of the products between the subsidiary 
15 
and the affiliate. 
Very often lower costs and familiarity with the parent's 
supplies, especially in design-oriented products, are the main 
reasons for a Canadian subsidiary buying through its parent. 
A.J. Wallace of Earl Hobinson Automotive ^arts of Oshawa, pointed out 
that even when a Canadian parts manufacturer produced a comparable 
part (the only difference in some cases being the manufacturer's 
name which is stamped on the part) at the same price as that manu-
factured in the United States, the Canadian automobile manufacturer 
would as often as not continue to use the part which its parent had 
lk 
Beechey Interview, Oshawa, July 8, 1971. 
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A l 6 always used. 
Mr. Shelley of Ford of Canada confirmed Mr. Wallace's state-
ment; he noted that even when a Canadian parts manufacturer was able 
to produce a part similar to the one already being used at about the 
same price, which according to Mr. Shelley, happens very rarely, 
Ford of Canada tends to stay with the part it has been using rather 
than making changes in the delivery schedule and assembly line to 
which Ford has become accustomed. Perhaps most significant for our 
purposes here, however, is that Mr. Shelley could not say that Ford 
of Canada would definitely and on its own purchase new parts for its 
assembly line which are superior in quality and comparable in cost 
to those already being used, no matter where these new parts were 
17 being manufactured. 
The Automobile Agreement strengthens the single market type 
of operation described above. As this phenomenon develops the operation 
of Ford of Canada tends to lose its financial integrity in the sense 
that profits may be transferred to the parent corporation without the 
benefits of ownership accuring to Canadians. The evidence for this
 / 
likelihood is that Ford of Canada which sells its stocks to the 
Canadian public, as opposed to General Motors of Canada which does not, 
was 8l percent owned in 1969 by the parent firm and the Ford family 
as opposed to 7^.9 percent in 196^ before the Agreement came into 
effect. Therefore, the Automobile Agreement as a model of Canada-
Wallace Interview, Oshawa, August 12, 1971-
7Shelley Interview, July 5. 1971. 
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United states economic integration works against the development of an 
industrial strategy by the Canadian government which promotes Canadian 
participation in ownership of all Canadian business. 
The nature of the automobile industry in Canada, because it 
is effectively a United States subsidiary and because of the integ-
ration within the industry itself, has provided for the extension 
into Canada of American technical skills, management skills, product 
innovation, and the need for capital to create and cultivate taste 
formation through advertising. There are advantages and disadvantages 
in having this type of an operation in Canada. I feel that the 
disadvantages outweigh the advantages. The advantage of having this 
type of an operation is that the Canadian automobile industry has 
access to perhaps the most developed automobile industry in the world. 
Having access to, and being directly affiliated with, the 
United States-based automobile industry, however, means ultimately 
that the Canadian automobile industry's potential is limited to 
growth rather than real development. The sharpening of Canadian 
technical skills in the automobile industry will not be required 
since the Canadian industry has access to all the new techniques 
which are developed in the United States. Canadian management skills 
in the automobile industry are limited in scope. The Canadian manager 
is left to increase the sales of an automobile product in the areas 
for which he is responsible. The Canadian president of a subsidiary 
automobile manufacturing concern is unlikely ever to be in a position 
to accept the blame for initiating the production of the Edsel or to 
accept the credit for initiating the production of the Mustang. The 
Canadian manager's job is primarily to sell these products. Because 
21 
the products of the Canadian and American automobile industries are so 
similar, these products are advertised in very much the same way in 
both countries. Potential Canadian automobile consumers are urged, 
like their American counterparts, to "move up". Despite the wide-
spread Canadian consumer acceptance of mid-size and compact cars, the 
automobile industry in Canada tells Canadians to "move up" because 
that is what its affiliate does in the United States, rather than 
taking advantage of the widespread Canadian desire for economy cars. 
None of thece features of the automobile industry in Canada are harmful 
in themselves so long as Canadians and their government are satisfied 
that it is enough for the automobile industry in this country to grow 
according to American specifications rather than to develop the features 
mentioned above according to particular Canadian needs. 
The Automobile Agreement is instructive as a model indicating the 
kinds if effects which result from economic integration between Canada 
and the United States. The Canadian government cannot maintain, much 
less direct, Canada's political nationality if development of the 
economic growth of the country is directly related to a spin-off from 
the United States economy. The Automobile Agreement moves Canada in 
exactly the direction of reliance on the spin-off effect of the United 
States economy and so undermines the Canadian political nationality. 
The automobile industry in Canada has not always been a 
subsidiary operation. The McLaughlin companies which began operation 
in 1867» in Oshawa, Ontario, were Canadian pioneers in transportation 
equipment. The wholly-owned and operated Canadian company began to 
produce automobiles in the l890's. The operation must have been 
successful or General Motors of the United States would not have 
offered R.S. McLaughlin the opportunity for a merger between the 
two in 1918. Colonel K.S. McLaughlin was nothing if not a shrewd 
businessman and the opportunity to join forces with a giant such 
as General Motors is one that very few Canadian, past or present, 
would pass up. Colonel McLaughlin retained his position as President 
of the Canadian operation of General Motors after the merger and at 
the same time received a position on the Board of Directors of the 
American division of General Motors. Colonel McLaughlin retained 
both of these positions until his death two years ago, which is an 
example of the respect in which the man was held by his American 
counterparts. 
The purpose of this brief history of the automobile industry 
in Canada is to demonstrate that the existence of this particular 
industry is dependent upon north-south commercial ties or in other 
words, access to the Lnited States market. The McLaughlin experience 
suggests that a Canadian automobile concern can exist only by having 
access to the American market in addition to its share of the Canadian 
market. Colonel McLaughlin secured the survival of his own operation 
in Canada and achieved access to the American market at the same time 
by joining forces with the American-based General Motors in 1918. 
The tradition of north-south ties between the automobile 
industries of Canada and the United States has long since been estab-
lished and the examples mentioned above illustrate the trend. The 
19 
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Automobile Agreement is evidence of the Canadian government's position 
that the access by the Canadian automobile industry to the American 
market is more important than the potential erosion of Canada's 
national identity which is founded on east-west ties of commerce and 
culture. The government, through the Automobile Agreement, has so 
committed the automobile industry in Canada to north-south integration 
with its United States counterpart that not only is Canada's long term 
political interest undermined but also the vitality of the industry 
itself in Canada. The Automobile Agreement, according to one description, 
has left Ford of Canada's headquarters as "a merchandising shell housing 
only the functions of finance, marketing and planning, industrial 
relations, dealer affairs and public relations". The Canadian govern-
ment may have acquired economic access to the United States automobile 
market through the Automobile Agreement at the long term political 
expense of Canada. It is unlikely that the Automobile Agreement in 
itself will bring about the political demise of Canada, the Agreement 
does, however, undermine the validity of the east-west political axis 
upon which this country is founded. 
The negotiation of the Canada-United States Automotive Agree-
ment was preceded by a series of circumstances which were in some ways 
unique to the automobile industry and in other ways subject to circum-
stances which were imposed by well-intentioned Canadian governments on 
the industry generally. Dealing with the latter first, it would be no 
understatement to say that the automobile industry in Canada prior to 
1965 was profoundly affected by the tariff rates set on imports of 
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 152. 
automobiles and parts by Canada's main customer, the United States. 
In Canada, the import tariff rate from 1936 to 19&5 w a s 
set at seventeen and one-half percent of the wholesale cost of the 
item. This charge could be avoided on parts imported into Canada 
if the Canadian content of these parts and manufacturing costs were 
equivalent to sixty percent of the factory cost for cars and fifty 
percent of the factory cost for commercial vehicles. A twenty-five 
percent tariff was charged on major imported items, such as passenger 
21 
car engines and automatic transmissions. Similarly, the finished 
vehicles and parts which were manufactured in Canada and imported by 
22 United States concerns were subject to roughly similar rates. It 
is not important to compare the tariff rates of the two countries; 
however, it is important to note that the rationale behind the 
application of a relatively high tariff rested on protecting Canada's 
domestic industry. 
There is a double irony in this rationale as it was applied 
to the Canadian automobile industry by the Canadian government. In 
the first place, if one is inclined to be cynical one could ask just 
what industry there was to protect once Colonel MacLaughlin allied 
his firm to the United States-based General Motors in 1918. In the 
second place, the tariff has had the effect in many manufacturing 
industries — and the automobile industry is no exception — of 
21 
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encouraging the type of branch plant operation of which Canadians 
have become ever more acutely aware. 
The imposition of a tariff by the Canadian government prior 
to 196^ is evidence that the government was of the opinion that 
economic policies which effectively kept foreign automobiles out of 
Canada helped to achieve the objective of the growth and development 
of the automobile industry in Canada. The Automobile Agreement which 
has replaced the tariff structure has limited the Canadian govern-
ment to the achievement of growth alone in the automobile industry 
in Canada in return for unlimited access to the United States market. 
The Automobile Agreement is a precedent which works against the 
implementation of wholly independent tax and monetary policies which 
are designed to achieve the national objective of the growth and 
development of all industry in Canada. As far as the consumer was 
concerned he knew that in Canada, prior to 196>, it cost him a great 
deal more money to buy a new car than it did for his American counter-
part and most Canadians seemed to accept this fatalistically. Canadian 
consumers have since then discovered that a Canada-United States 
Automobile Agreement has made precious little difference in the higher 
cost of their new automobiles as compared to the prices they would pay 
for the car if they resided in the United states, since the Canadian 
government has restricted the duty-free importation of automobiles to 
manufacturers. 
As for the automobile industry itself in Canada, two key 
features distinguish the industry prior to 196i?: the Canadian industry 
23 
See the Appendix, for the complete text of the Agreement. 
was attempting to offer a full range of models which not only 
eliminated cost reductions which might have been possible through 
a high volume specialization in a few models and created difficulty 
in establishing export markets since it was offering a more expensive 
replica of a product already being produced in the United states. 
Also, production inefficiency generally stood out as the main reason 
for the fact that vehicle prices were ten percent higher in Canada <^  
prior to 1965 since employees in the automobile industry in Canada 
were paid thirty percent less than the American counterparts and 
since the return to capital was no higher in Canada than in the 
United States. 
The Automobile Agreement has led to high volume specialization 
in the automobile industry in Canada, but not to the reduction of 
retail vehicle prices in Canada to the point that they are the same 
25 
as the retail price of the same automobile in the United States. 
On the other hand, the integration of the two industries through the 
Automobile Agreement has brought about the demand for wage parity in 
26 
both countries based on a common cost of living index. The Auto-
mobile Agreement is not in the long term political interest of Canada 
to the extent that it restricts the government from fulfilling 
economic policies which are designed to achieve distinctly Canadian 
wages. 
2k 
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June 2, 1967). 
It is important to note the general political mood in Canada, 
as well as some specific events which occurred immediately prior to 
the signing of the Automobile Agreement in 1965. The general mood 
in Canada was one of disquiet since the first official notice of 
concern in Ottawa over the extent of United States ownership of 
industry in Canada became manifest in the preliminary report of the 
Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, published in 1956. 
The Commission was headed by Walter Gordon who was to implement some 
of the recommendations of the report as Minister of Finance in 1963« 
The government commissioned V.W. Bladen, an economist at the University 
of Toronto, to study the automobile industry in Canada. The Bladen 
pO 
Commission made its report in 196l. 
For the purposes of this study it is sufficient to note that 
Bladen recommended that: Canadian content in automobiles should be 
expanded to include parts sold to foreign buyers (called extended 
content); replacement parts production in Canada should be encouraged; 
and all imported automotive items should have the same status instead 
of giving special treatment to specific items such as automatic 
29 
transmissions. Bladen's cardinal concern simply was good cost 
performance for the automobile industry as it operated in Canada. 
Rather than following the recommendations of the one-man 
27 
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Bladen Commission, the government established its own program which 
consisted of two "duty remission" plans. A partial program was 
30 
established in October 1962, and a full program was implemented, 
31 
albeit for a short duration, in October 1963. In each case the 
plan provided that only a manufacturer of automobiles, and not a 
parts manufacturer, was eligible for the duty refund. Before going 
into the reasons why the second plan survived only for five months 
- until March, 196*f - it is necessary to compare the two plans to 
get an understanding of their effect on the industry as well as the 
direction the Canadian government hoped that the automobile industry 
would take, prior to the Automobile Agreement itself. 
The Bladen Report and the Duty Remission Plans were similar 
in that they were designed to create a more efficient and effective 
industry by removing tariffs on imports by rewarding export performance. 
Also both schemes provided an incentive for replacement parts production. 
There were, however, differences between the two programs. Bladen's 
plan would have probably led to some degree of increased efficiency 
For the text of this plan see, Canada, Order in Council: 
Privy Council Office (Ottawa, P.C. 1962 - I/I536). 
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For the text of this plan see, Canada, Order in Council; 
Privy Council Office (Ottawa, P.C. 1963 - 1/15M0. The first duty 
remission plan implemented by the Canadian government required that 
a twenty-five percent duty be collected on automatic transmissions. 
This duty could, however, be reclaimed from the Canadian Customs 
Department as $ 1.00 was returned for each $ 1.00 increase in the 
Canadian content of parts. There were no United States objections 
(from the government nor the automobile industry) to this plan which 
was in effect from November, 1961, until the end of October, 1962. 
The second duty remission plan was essentially an extension of the 
first. The second plan was to be a full duty remission program which 
would have required a $ 1.00 refund on any new vehicle and original 
parts for $ 1.00 of Canadian content in parts and vehicle exports over 
and above the base level established during the first plan which, as 
has been mentioned, ran from November 196I until the following October, 
29 
but not to integration, while the duty remission plans provided for 
cost reductions which were average cost reductions and which were 
based on tariff savings. Further, the Bladen recommendations would 
likely have had little effect on the Canada-United States automotive 
trade balance, while it is likely that the duty remission plans 
(especially the second one) would have decreased the Canadian deficit. 
The second duty remission plan was short-lived as a firm in 
Wisconsin, the Modine Manufacturing Company, requested that counter-
vailing duties be applied by the United States on those parts 
exported from Canada into the United States under the terms of 
32 
section 303 of "the United States Custom Act, 1930". The Canadian 
government dropped the duty remission plan before the countervailing 
duties were applied and even before Modine brought its case before the 
courts. In fairness, however, it should be pointed out that the plan 
was becoming a critical issue in Canadian-American trade relations 
by March of 196^. The complaint of the Modine Company was the only 
one which became public although it seems safe to assume that there 
were other complaints from other American manufacturers since the 
United States government was apparently prepared to apply counter-
vailing duties in response to the Canadian plan. 
The favourable disposition of the United States government 
32 
C.E. Beigie, op.cit., p. 39. It should be noted that this 
crucial question in Canada-United States trade relations, - whether 
making one country's tariffs on imports a function of export perfor-
mance automatically effects the imposition of countervailing sanctions 
by the other country, - has never been fully tested in the courts 
of either country. 
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towards the complaints of its manufacturers against the Canadian 
duty remission plans and its apparent preparedness to test the 
complaint of the Modine Company in the courts with a view of 
obtaining legal sanction for the application of countervailing 
duties was probably the reason for the short life of the second 
plan. Because of the negative response of the United States 
government to the Canadian government's attempt to reduce the 
Canadian deficit in automobile trade with the United States through 
the means of duty remissions, the Canadian government felt it had 
no alternative but to seek some other means favourable to the 
American government which would achieve the effective reduction of 
the Canadian deficit in automobile trade. Also, with the removal 
of the second plan, Canada was again in the position of having to 
reduce costs below United States costs to overcome the American tariff 
and so open the North American market to the Canadian automobile 
industry. It was with this in mind that Canada and the United States 
negotiated a contract in their trade relations as these pertain to 
the automobile industry which became known after 196^ as the Canada-
United States Automobile Agreement. 
In early October, 196^, the first meetings took place between 
the government and the automobile industry in Canada which culminated 
in the Canadian proposals for the Automobile Agreement with the United 
States. The cabinet minister most directly involved in the plan in 
October and later in the negotiations with the United States was 
CM. Drury, then Minister of Industry. The public service negotiators 
Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971• 
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were headed by Simon Reisman, then Deputy Minister of the Department 
of Industry. The automobile industry was represented by the "big 
four" Canadian manufacturers, as well as the Automotive Parts 
1 of 
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35 Manufacturers Association. At this point in the formulation 
the Agreement, the government requested secrecy from all involved.' 
Mr. Barr and Mr, Thorn both indicated that there was no secrecy 
involved in the negotiations. It is my conclusion that they were 
referring to the negotiations with the United States and not to the 
negotiations which D.S. Wood, President of the Automotive Parts 
Manufacturers Association, mentioned in his memorandum to members of 
the Association. The meetings between the groups were extensive. 
Mr. Wood indicated that: 
At least fifteen meetings were held by the Automotive Parts 
Manufacturers Association with Mr. Drury and his staff prior 
to the announcement of the new U.S./Canada Automotive Agree-
ment on January 15, 1965• Correspondence and telephone conver-
sations were on a day to day basis.-'' 
An interview with D.C. Thorn was most useful in filling in the 
background details which influenced Canadian thinking prior to 
January 15, 1965* Mr. Thorn indicated that there were two key 
34 
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key initiatives were taken by the Department of Industry although the 
departments of Finance, Trade and Commerce, and Labour, to a lesser 
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circumstances which influenced the Canadian desire to reach an agree-
ment. Both the government and the industry wanted automobile production 
in Canada to become more efficient. After the call for countervailing 
duties by the Modine Company, the Canadian and United States govern-
ments were determined to arrive at some plan which would have allowed 
the greater efficiency which the duty remission plans (albeit on a 
limited scale) were also designed to accomplish as well as reducing 
38 
,.,39 
the Canadian deficit in automobile trade.' 
The new plan also took into account the "Canadian Mood1 
which Mr. Thorn described as the first noticeable rumblings of concern 
by government over the extent and implications of United States owner-
ship of Canadian industry. Since automobile manufacturing is completely 
foreign owned, the new plan was formulated with the idea of maintaining 
a specific degree of Canadian influence on the industry as a whole. 
In short, the new plan was concerned with effecting market efficiency, 
while maintaining Canadian influence since, as one respondent said, 
"Canada just doesn't have a car". Through the Automobile Agreement 
the Canadian government hoped to increase efficiency in the automobile 
industry in Canada and to reduce the deficit in Canadian automobile 
trade with the United States by allowing Canadian automobile manu-
facturers to integrate their operations with their American parent 
firms subject to the fulfillment of the two provisions previously 
mentioned. 
5
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D.C. Thorn indicated that the public service felt by the end 
of L^bk that increased efficiency in the Canadian automobile industry 
and a reduction in Canada's automotive trade deficit could best be 
achieved through partial integration of the Canadian and American 
industries and that if anticipated opposition to such a scheme was 
overcome in Cabinet, it would be desirable to avoid the double 
jeopardy of a full and potentially hostile debate before parliament 
which, conveniently for the government, was not in session at the 
kl time the treaty was signed. 
The Automobile Agreement was implemented in 1965 by Order-
in-Council. Mr. Thorn indicated that the Liberal government had no 
special reason for using an Order-in-Council other than to say that 
k2 
this was "standard parliamentary procedure". It should be pointed 
out that this procedure allowed the Canadian government to implement 
the Agreement without reference to Parliament. Mr. Thorn would not 
suggest that this disquiet over foreign ownership in Canada was not 
a factor in the decision to bring the Agreement into effect without 
a debate in Parliament. It is my conclusion, however, based on an 
interview with an Opposition member, that it was precisely because 
of the concern over foreign ownership that the government chose to 
use an Order-in-Council to bring the Automobile Agreement into effect. 
A.D. "ales pointed out that he felt his charge that the Automobile 
kl 




Agreement was a sell-out would have carried more weight if it had 
been brought out repeatedly during the course of a lengthy debate 
which a minority government would have difficulty regulating. 
The government anticipated the political reaction of the Opposition 
which was of a damning nature to say the least. 
The best way for a minority government to achieve a 
modified free trade arrangement and to survive opposition pressure, 
was to reduce to a minimum the length of time it is subjected to 
charges of selling the national economic birthright. An Order-in-
Council was the pragmatic means by which the government achieved 
both its desired ends. 
There is one other detail concerning the negotiations between 
Canada and the United States which remains unresolved. It has been 
46 
suggested that the United States agreed to the terms of the Auto-
mobile Agreement in return for the Canadian assurance that the recom-
mendations made by a Royal Commission headed by Senator Gratton 
O'Leary regarding advertising in Time and Reader's Digest magazines 
Hales Interview, Ottawa, February 1&, 1971. 
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not be implemented. Senator O'Leary's commission, which reported in 
196l, recommended that the expenditures on advertising placed in the 
Canadian editions of publications such as Time and Header's Digest 
should no longer be tax deductible. Henry R. i.uce, the editor-in-
chief of Time, contributed to this recommendation when he told the 
O'Leary Commission that in no way did he consider Time to be a 
Canadian magazine. In January, I961?. the Canadian Cabinet debated 
whether the recommendation should be implemented. According to one 
journalistic account, when the American Department of State heard of 
these deliberations, it put direct pressure on the Cabinet by stating 
that if the two publications were not exempt from tax in Canada 
hi 
"congressional approval of the Auto Fact would be placed in jeopardy". 
It is known that Mr. Luce and Dean Husk, who was United States 
Secretary of State at this time, were very close friends so the 
source of the pressure by the American government seems apparent. 
The American pressure influenced the Cabinet to decide with 
C.M. Drury that Time and Header's Digest should be exempt from the 
recommended advertising tax. Mr. Drury was being very pragmatic 
in arguing before the Cabinet for an exemption for the magazines since 
Reader's Digest is published in Mr. Drury's constituency of Westmount, 
and since he was the minister responsible for the Canadian half of the 
Automobile Agreement. The Cabinet decided with Mr. Drury that there 
would be no Automobile Agreement if it decided to tax the advertising 
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in Time and Reader's Digest. Walter Gordon, who. was Mr. Drury's cabinet 
colleague at the time of the Auto Pact negotiations between Canada 
and the United states, points out that "approval of the Automobile 
Agreement mipht have been jeopardized if a serious dispute had 
arisen with Washington over Time". In my interview with D.C. Thorn, 
he categorically denied that the Auto Pact was part of a bargain 
50 
which also involved the dropping of the O'Leary recommendations. 
Although I thought at the time that Mr. Thorn was rather too defensive 
in answering this question, I might have discounted these suggestions, 
since Thorn was closely involved with the negotiations, if I had not 
received a diametrically opposite viewpoint from another source. 
Bert Barr of the Deparmtnet of Industry, Trade and Commerce, said 
that such a trade off "not only makes sense, but also is very 
51 
conceivable". 
My conclusion is that while "this trade off probably was not 
mentioned directly over the bargaining table, it is more than likely 
that the Canadians were made aware informally that the Americans 
would be in a better frame of mind to negotiate the Automobile Agree-
ment if the O'Leary recommendations were shelved. It was against this 
background that the Canada-United States Automobile Agreement was 
arranged through formal intergovernmental discussions and then jointly 
announced, as has been mentioned above, on January 15* 1965* 
^9 
W.L. Gordon, op.cit. Paul Martin and Maurice Sauve 
supported Mr. Drury's position in Cabinet discussions on this matter. 
Thorn Interview, August 3« 1971* 
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The Canadian government hoped to achieve several immediate 
effects by negotiating and ratifying the Automobile Agreement. The 
first of these was, of course, to eliminate the United States tariff 
on Canadian automotive exports, as well as the Canadian rebates which 
had previously brought about the threat of American countervailing 
duties. Further, the Canadian government saw the Agreement as the 
first step toward the removal of various structural barriers which , 
had hindered efficient production. The government felt that the 
Agreement would eliminate the barriers of large inventories, unreli-
able supply, and result in larger production runs of fewer models so 
that the industry could then achieve economies of scale. A long term 
effect which the government hoped to achieve through the Agreement was 
the achievement of what has been called a "fair and equitable share" 
of the North American automotive market. Although there are several 
interpretations as to what exactly the above phrase means, D.C.Thorn 
indicated that the government was concerned in this instance with the 
53 
continuing growth in production of the automobile industry in Canada. 
The immediate effects were achieved as the Agreement went into effect 
and growth in production has occurred but not without substantial 
repercussions in Canada. Production has grown for two main reasons. 
First, the Canadian automobile industry now has unlimited access to 
the American market, without duty being charged. Second, in several 
cases the automobile manufacturers in Canada now produce for a 
Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971* 
55Ibid. 
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North American market. For example, American Motors produces its 
Hornet model for eastern Canada and the eastern United states at 
Brampton, Ontario. The Hornet is also manufactured at Kenosha, 
Wisconsin, for customers in western Canada and the western United 
States. 
Political opposition to the Automobile Agreement at the 
time it was announced was limited indeed for two reasons. One of 
these has already been mentioned, namely, that in bringing the 
Agreement into effect by Order-in-Council the government was able to 
avoid any debate in Parliament over the merits or demerits of the 
Agreement. The second reason for the lack of political opposition was 
that the initial reaction to the potential economic benefits was 
favourable. The Globe and Mail editorialized that the Agreement 
"offers important benefits to the people of both countries and to the 
automobile industries of both countries". Similarly, the Toronto 
Daily Star stated that the "benefits of the Agreement are clear and 
55 
obvious to Ottawa". The Montreal Gazette concurred that the 
% 
"agreement allows for new growth", and the Winnipeg Free Press 
expressed the hope that the benefits which accrued to the manufacturers 
57 because of the Agreement would be "passed on to the consumer". 
5k 
Editorial, Toronto Globe and Mail, January l8, 1%5, p. 6. 
55 
E d i t o r i a l , Toronto Daily S t a r , January 20, 1965, p . 7« 
56 
Editorial, Montreal Gazette, October k, 1965, p. 6. 
57 
E d i t o r i a l , Winnipeg Free P r e s s , January 20 , 1965» P« 6 . 
39 
In li^ht of this response favouring the economic benefits of 
the Agreement, it is perhaps not surprising that the Conservative 
critic, A.D. Hales'charged before Parliament that the Agreement 
58 
represented "a complete sell out" by the government caused so 
little interest. Heid Scott M.P., the New Democratic Party critic 
of the Agreement prior to 1968, did not object to the Agreement 
because of its integrative character, as one might have expected 
from an N.D.P. critic, but rather because the Agreement was 
59 implemented only with'"the concurrence of parliament" rather than 
through a full debate before parliament. 
The government has also had to deal with some problems as a 
result of this rationalization process. The government set up a 
program of Transitional Adjustment Benefits (T.A.B.) in August, 1965« 
to assist manufacturers and employees while the rationalization process 
was continuing. The automobile manufacturers and parts producers used 
the T.A.B. program to retool, and in some cases redesign,their pro-
duction processes. Government benefits were also available to workers 
who had to move their homes or who were otherwise disrupted as a 
result of the rationalization process carried on after the Automobile 
Agreement went into effect. From 1965 until June, 19711 the Canadian 
government had paid out over & 85 million in Transitional Adjustment 
Benefits to manufacturers who have altered their production and to 
58 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, March J l , 1965)1 
p . 13005. 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, February l 8 , 
1965) , P . I IV58. 
families who have altered their lives as a result of the Agreement. 
Conservative critic A.D. Hales supported the announcement 
of the T.A.B. benefits and indicated that CM. Drury, the Minister 
of Industry, had no choice but to introduce such a program since the 
Automobile Agreement had put Canadian parts manufacturers "in such a 
terrible position that something had to be done to help them 
survive". The N.D.P. critic, Reid Scott, supported the concept 
of the T.A.B. program because it offered financial support to auto-
motive workers who were dislocated as a result of the Agreement. 
Nevertheless Mr. Scott criticized the plan for two reasons. First 
of all, he said that the automotive worker should not be expected to 
62 
contribute "the major portion of the cost" of the plan. This 
position is not surprising considering that labour unions are an 
important source of funds to the New Democratic Party. Second, 
Mr. Scott complained that the benefits paid to Canadian workers were 
not equivalent to those being paid to American workers who were dis-
63 
located by the Agreement. This position is interesting, not because 
the N.D.P. critic was demanding increased benefits for Canadian workers, 
but rather because it does not question the political implications 
effected by the integrative character of the Automobile Agreement. 
60 
Jean-Luc Pepin, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce; 
Press Release -17-16-70,(Ottawa, June 1970). 




Ibid., p. 2911. 
63, 
41 
As the Canadian government must have expected, the big four 
of the automobile industry set up their production operations on a 
North American basis. This more integrated operation dulls further 
what little distinction there had been between the Canadian and 
American automobile industries and encourages more centralized 
decision-making from the United States head offices of the automobile 
manufacturers. The Automobile Agreement indicates that the Canadian 
government sees the branch plant operations of United States manu-
facturers as the best means of automobile production in Canada. 
The Automobile Agreement promotes further integration of the Canadian 
and American automobile industries and so encourages overall production 
decisions affecting the automobile industry in Canada to be made in 
head offices in the United States. 
In fact, without the production safeguards which Canada 
added to the Agreement, it is conceivable that all of Canada's auto-
mobile requirements would be met by production carried on solely in 
the United States. The government has, through a political decision, 
elected not only to perpetuate the branch plant production of 
automobiles in this country, but also to allow the automobile manu-
facturers to refine these operations to their advantage through 
centralized decision-making, which is subject only to indirect Canadian 
political influence. For example, as a result of the Agreement, the 
Chrysler Corporation now manufacturers its Dodge Dart in Canada 
according to the North American demand for this particular model. 
If the American sales of the Dart were to fall, the evidence suggests 
that Chrysler could cut back on the production of these cars regardless 
of the Canadian demand for them and of the Canadian workers employed 
in making, thera. '60 long as Chrysler continues to fulfill the overall 
terms of the Agreement, the Canadian government is limited to 
requesting that Chrysler's head office in the United States reconsider 
such a decision. It is in this way that the Automobile Agreement can 
restrict the Canadian government's influence on the automobile industry 
in this country. 
If one assumes that the economic interest of the automobile 
industry is always, or usually, in the best political interest of 
the country there would be no dispute over the value of the Automobile 
Agreement in Canada. We have already seen, however, that the economic 
interests of the automobile industry are very often not in the political 
interest of the country, nor in the interest of the development of a 
far-reaching industrial strategy of this country. The Automobile 
Agreement, therefore, denies the validity of the pursuit by the 
Canadian government of the kind of political interests and industrial 
strategy which I feel will promote the political and economic integrity 
of Canada in the future. 
CHAPTER II 
THE POLITICAL INPUT OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
TO THE AUTOMOBILE AGREEMENT 
This section is devoted to an examination of the Canadian 
automobile industry's assessment of the Automobile Agreement both 
before and after the signing of the Agreement and the input the 
industry has had with regard to the Canadian half of the Agreement. 
For the purpose of this study, the "big four" auto manufacturers, 
the parts manufacturing industry, and the automobile labour union, 
(the United Auto Workers) comprise the automobile industry in Canada. 
I will discuss the role of these three main segments of the industry 
in that order. 
As the result of my investigation there is no doubt that the 
Canadian automobile manufacturers - General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, 
and American Motors - were the strongest influence which encouraged 
the Canadian and United States governments to negotiate the Automobile 
Agreement. The evidence supporting this notion is substantial, and it 
should be stated at the outset that the manufacturers' political 
influence must not be under-rated. However, because that influence 
has been so great the Canadian government finds itself in a position 
Interviews were conducted with representatives of General 
Motors of Canada and Ford of Canada. See Beechey Interview, July 8, 
1971, and Shelley Interview, July 5, 1971. 
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which is less than advantageous. The government, as a result of 
the Agreement, has given up its direct influence on the automobile 
industry in Canada by agreeing to a North American basis of automobile 
production. 
The Agreement ensures a certain level of automobile production 
in Canada (based on the 1964 model year) and also invites further 
integration of the Canadian and American automobile industries. One 
result of this increased integration, as described in Chapter I, is 
that the locus of decision-making for the automobile industry has 
shifted to head offices in the United States. Therefore, decisions 
with regard to the operation of the automobile industry in this country 
are now made in the United States. The Canadian government can only 
effectively influence the automobile industry in this country by 
dealing with foreign executives in a foreign country. The United 
States government, on the other hand, can directly influence the 
automobile industry in that country since the locus of decision-
making for that industry rests effectively in the United States. 
The automobile industry and the government both see the 
Automobile Agreement as a vehicle to achieve increased efficiency 
and rationalization in the manufacture of automobiles in Canada. 
Indeed, Joel Shelley of Ford of Canada, Hugh Beechey of General 
Motors of Canada and Bert Barr of the Department of Industry, Trade 
and Commerce used exactly the same phrase when they declared that 
the agreement had successfully overcome the problem of "short 
production runs". Similarly, Mr. Beechey and D.C. Thorn, of the 
2 
cf. Barr Interview, August 3, 1971. Shelley Interview, 
July 5, 1971; and Beechey Interview, July 8, 1971. 
Department of finance, used exactly the same phrase when describing 
another hoped for effect of the Agreement, namely that the auto-
mobile industry in Canada would cease to be a "costly duplication 
in miniature of its counterpart in the United States". To some 
extent this latter objective has also been realized. I cite these 
examples of similar phraseology which portray the common thinking 
of the individuals mentioned above, to indicate that there was and 
is more than chance agreement among the government and industry 
regarding the general accomplishment of the Automobile Agreement. 
The terms efficiency and rationalization are generally used to 
define the objectives and working-nature of the Agreement and the 
four men mentioned above not only agreed on the use of these terms 
in describing the Agreement, but also defined them in the same way. 
The manufacturers have a further indirect, though substantial, 
influence which the government could not ignore before 196^ + anymore 
than it can ignore that influence now. The Ford Motor Company of 
Canada paid i l}k million in sales and income taxes in 1968, and 
produced at the same time a ft ^ 0.2 million profit after taxes. It 
should be remembered that the General Motors operation in Canada is 
roughly two-fifths as large again compared to Ford using the Letters 
of Undertaking as a measure. These two giants combined still leave 
one-quarter of the automobile market in Canada to Chrysler, American 
Motors and others, such as Volkswagen and Toyota. 
3 
cf. Thorn Interview, August 3, 1971; and Beechey Interview, 
July 8, 1971. 
"Report on Business", Toronto Globe and Mail, February 8, 
1969. 
The industry also has a further influence. The automobile 
industry in Canada exported, in the first nine months of 1970, 
j> 2.6 billion worth of finished products, as well as engines and 
5 
parts. That total seems to be increasing yearly although complete 
recent statistics were not available at the time of writing. The 
automobile industry as a whole was Canada's largest exporter in 
1970. It seems obvious then that the automobile industry, given 
its economic clout, would be misguided not to try to influence the 
government to negotiate an Agreement which would be beneficial to 
the industry and to the government in terras of immediate export and 
balance of payments statistics but at the expense of Canadian 
political control over decision-making within the industry and long 
term options affecting the industry. 
By the same token, the Canadian government, dependent as it 
is on exports, and realizing the size of tax revenue it collects 
from the industry, would be foolish not to listen to the represent-
ations of the automobile industry. The Automobile Agreement more 
than satisfied the manufacturers. As the past president of Ford 
of Canada, K.K. Scott, stated on February 2, 1969 to the Canadian 
Club of Ottawa: "... we strongly endorse the autopact as a model 
for government-industry collaboration and we advocate for it a 
permanent place in the fabric of our industry". Roy Bennett, who 
"Report on Business", Toronto G^obe and Mail, November 11, 
1970. The Globe and Mail arrived at this figure from a computation 
of tables published by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. 
K.E. Scott, A Speech to the Canadian Club (Ottawa, 
February 2, 1969). 
succeeded Mr. Scott in November, 1970, and who was heavily involved 
7 
in the Automobile Agreement, agrees: "It has been a very healthy 
thing for all the companies and the economy as a whole". 
It would be unlikely indeed that the manufacturers could be 
unhappy with the Agreement in view of the fact that the mutual 
objectives, (which they hold with the government), of "efficiency" 
and "rationalization" have been partially realized through the 
Agreement. Certainly production runs in Canada are longer, thus 
meeting the requirement given above since production decisions are 
now geared to North American needs. This is evidenced by the fact 
that sixty percent of the vehicles produced in Canada in 1968 were 
exported to the United States as compared to seven percent in 1964. 
During 1968 vehicle imports from the United States accounted for 
forty percent of the Canadian market as compared to three percent 
in 1964.9 
At the same time the Agreement has permitted rationalization 
within each' company. Mr. Shelley pointed out that Ford now produces 
its model line Maverick for "eastern North America" in Canada, while 
the needs of "western North America" are met at Ford's plant in 
Michigan. Obviously there is little chance for duplication to 
9 
Joel Shelley confirmed that Mr. Bennettwas the key spokesman 
for Ford of Canada to the Canadian government while the latter was 
formulating its position on the proposed policy for the automobile 
industry. Shelley Interview, July 5, 1971* 
o 
"Report on Business", Toronto Globe and Mail, November 19, 19 
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C.E. Beigie, op.cit., pp. 77-96. 
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occur in Canada, much less North America, using this kind of 
production scheme. This particular scheme is not general to the 
industry but it is an example of the concrete application of the 
definition and the kind of rationalization which the industry and 
the government hoped to achieve through the Agreement. There is 
strong evidence that the influence of the automobile industry on the 
government prior to the signing of the Agreement was pervasive. 
Officers of the automobile industry such as Roy Bennett, ^ resident of 
Ford of Canada, and D.S. Wood, President of the Automotive Parts 
Manufacturers Association of Canada and government officials such as 
Mr. Thorn and Mr. Barr, are in agreement not only in what they see as 
the objectives of the Agreement, but also in the terms by which they 
describe thoue objectives. 
That the automobile manufacturers in Canada and the United 
States have been silent during the discussions which have taken place 
between Canadian and American government officials with regard to 
changing the Agreement, indicates to me that the automobile industry 
has the kind of trading arrangement that it wants. There is no doubt 
that the government was more than aware of the industry's original 
market power, the industry's power over prices paid and charged, as 
well as the ability to obtain more than normal profits. Mr. Thorn made 
this amply clear when he indicated that General Motors set the price 
of its vehicles last, to which the other manufacturers adjust, in order 
11 
cf. D.S. Wood, op.cit., (May Ik, 1965); "Report on Business", 
Toronto Globe and Mail, November 1970; Thorn Interview, August 3i 1971; 
and Barr Interview, August 3, 1971. D.S. Wood, for example pointed out 
that conversations by telephone and letter between the automobile 
industry and the government were on a day to day basis from October 
1964 through December 1964. 
9^ 
to keep American Motors in business and thereby avoid any government 
scrutiny under anti-trust provisions in the United States or through 
12 
the Combines Investigation Act in Canada. With this kind of auto-
mobile industry power in mind, the government decided that duty free 
status would apply only to Canadian manufacturers who met the sales 
to production ratio and Canadian value-added provisions. These 
"safeguards", as they have been called, were and are designed to 
regulate the market power which the industry has. 
The manufacturers for their part have not criticized the 
Canadian government's attempt to regulate vehicle production and employ-
ment related to that production in this country. Mr. Bennett, 
President of Ford of Canada, states flatly that the desire for changes 
in the Automobile Agreement "does not have its origins in automobile 
industries on either side of the border which are happy with the 
13 
results of the Agreement". 
The automobile industry is very happy indeed. The Agreement 
it influenced, notwithstanding the safeguards which the Canadian govern-
ment included, has gone a long way toward helping to achieve exactly 
those goals of rationalization and efficiency which the automobile 
industry in this country considers vital. These goals are vital to 
the industry simpLy because they allow the manufacturers to produce 
automobiles more cheaply in this country and so make a larger profit. 
To ensure the continued production of automobiles in Canada, the govern-
ment restricted the duty free importation of automobiles to manufacturers 
12 
Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971. 
"Reports on Business", Toronto Globe and Mail, November 19, 
1970. 
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who met specific production standards (ie. the production safeguards) 
and thereby made concessions which may not be in this country's 
political interest. 
The government has conceded its independent tax policy on 
the importation of automobiles to this country and the revenue that 
policy generated in order to underwrite the existence of automobile 
manufacturers in Canada on the questionable assumption that the 
objectives of these manufacturers will naturally be coincident with 
Canadian national objectives. 
The government, by negotiating the Automobile Agreement, has 
facilitated the integration of the Canadian automobile industry with 
its United States counterpart to the economic benefit of the industry 
in Canada. As the process of integration is carried out, however, 
there is a tendency for the operation of the Canadian subsidiary to 
become further subordinated to that of its American parent with the 
net result oeing that the United States government is able to exercise 
political control over the actions of the automobile companies to the 
extent that they operate within a continental framework. The integ-
ration of the Canada and American economies in the automobile industry 
clearly involves a threat to Canada's political sovereignty as the 
distinction between the Canadian subsidiary operation and the United 
States parent operation dulls and as the locus of decision-making for 
a North American industry rests almost exclusively with tne parent firm 
in the United States. 
The existence of the Automobile Agreement did not inhibit the 
United States government from extending the benefits of the DISC 
program to the automobile manufacturers in that country. Similarly 
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Ford and Chrysler showed no reluctance to take advantage of the DISC 
scheme despite the assertion of the Canadian Minister of Industry, 
Trade and Commerce that by doing so these companies had violated 
Ik the Automobile Agreement. 
The United States government is able to offer tax benefits 
to its resident automobile manufacturers with the knowledge that 
these benefits will not only be attractive to the latter and vicariously 
to the American economy, but also that these corporate citizens are 
more likely to make use of these tax benefits since a greater share 
of the decision-making for the automobile industry has shifted to 
the United States because of the integration which has occurred in the 
North American automobile industry as a result of the Agreement. 
The changes in the operation of Ford of Canada, which have 
occurred since the Automobile Agreement came into effect, illustrate 
the nature of the integration which has developed generally in the 
automobile industry and the vicarious political threat posed to 
Canadian political decision-making that integration in the industry 
has brought about. 
Since the inception of the Automobile Agreement, the managers 
of Ford of Canada's assembly plants now meet production standards 
set in the United States where formerly they reported to the senior 
executive in Canada. The result is that the operation of the 
Ik 
A more complete description of the impact of the DISC 
program will occur in the next two chapters. 
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., pp. 67-70. 
Ibid., p. 67. 
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industry in Canada is further truncated. Purchasing for Ford, 
since the Agreement, has been carried out on a North American basis 
and some Canadian executives involved in this field now perform their 
17 duties in Michigan rather than Ontario. furthermore, virtually all 
exporting is now handled by Ford's parent company and since 1965 all 
foreign business is referred to it. All research and development 
done by Ford is centred in the United States as a result of the 
Agreement and Canadian tax and government incentives have not brought 
19 
about a change in this policy. i?ord of Canada still recruits and 
promotes its own managers, but due to the closer ties between sub-
sidiary and parent as a result of the Agreement, Ford-U.S. now 
scrutinizes senior Canadian appointments and Ford of Canada executives 
who are in line for the most important Canadian management positions 
are acquainted with Ford's worldwide operations. 
From the above discussion, it is obvious that the most important 
decisions for the operation of Ford in Canada are made in the United 
States and that this is a direct result of the integration brought 
about by the Automobile Agreement, The Canadian government has 
lessened substantially its ability to exercise political control over 
17 
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 69. 
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Ibid. By 1970 fifty Canadians were employed in research and 
development activity but at Ford's plant in Dearborn, Michigan. 
Af.D. Compton, executive director of Ford's research staff at Dearborn 
has said that company's research areas since 19&5 have become too 




the actions of an automobile company operating on a continental 
basis where decisions made by that company eminate almost completely 
from a head office in the United states 
Thus, in this important section of the Canadian economy, 
decisions concerning what is to be produced, where it is to be sold, 
from whom supplies are to be purchased and what funds are to be 
transferred, as well as charges for management, research, advertising 
services and the like, are made outside Canada according to the 
global strategy of foreign-based automobile manufacturers. Therefore, 
while the country is richer on the short term basis, the Canadian 
economy is less flexible in the long run and the instruments of public 
policy are constrained by this kind of formal commitment which arises 
from a bilateral arrangement, such as the Automobile Agreement, with 
the government of the United States. 
The Canadian automobile parts manufacturing industry also had 
a direct input to government in the formulation stages of the Automobile 
Agreement between October, 196^, and January, 1965. Their primary 
21 
contact in Ottawa was, again, CM. Drury, then Minister of Industry. 
The parts manufacturers, unlike the "big four" manufacturers, were 
unhappy with the proposed plan of October and are even more so seven 
years after the Automobile Agreement was signed. 
The parts manufacturers1 original complaint was that the proposed 
Agreement provided almost no safeguards for their industry and instead 
22 
"seemed to be directed mainly at expanding motor vehicle production". 
21D.S. Wood, op.cit. (May Ik, 1965). 
22 Ibid. 
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The parts manufacturers appear to have been exactly right. They 
insisted that Canadian content be fundamental in the plan and that 
this content be maintained on a percentage basis similar to the sales 
to production ratio provided for the automobile manufacturers. The 
government did agree to require that "Canadian value-added" be funda-
mental to the final Agreement which it would sign with the United 
States. However, the parts manufacturers could not persuade the 
government that the safeguards of the Canadian content should be 
maintained on a percentage basis. Hather, this safeguard required 
only that the Canadian content in motor vehicle production be "no less 
than was contained in motor vehicle production in the model year 1964". 
The parts manufacturers also managed to persuade the government that 
aftermarket parts should be excluded from the Agreement. 
The government was warned that the provisions mentioned above 
would make it virtually impossible for smaller parts producers to 
compete with their American counterparts while it would be difficult 
even for the large Canadian manufacturer. J.D. Loveridge and 
H.A. Wilson, executives of the Ingersoll Tool Company which manu-
factures automotive parts, warned Mr. Drury in March, 196bi that in 
order to survive, automotive parts manufacturers have to build up a 
personal relationship with the automobile producers which would be 
destroyed if Canadian content only were maintained. Mr. Loveridge 
told Mr. Drury that ultimately Canadian parts manufacturers would be 
placed in the position of "dealing with complete and utter 
D.S. Wood, op.cit., (May Ik, 1965). 
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strangers", who were headquartered in Detroit (in this particular 
case) and who generally show a marked bias in favour of dealing with 
suppliers in their own country with whom they are familiar. 
Duplate Canada Limited, for example, found itself in exactly 
this position as the Ford plant in Detroit, Michigan decided in 
January 1972 that both the American Ford firm and its Windsor, 
Ontario subsidiary would purchase the parts which Duplate Canada 
Limited had previously supplied to the Windsor operation from firms 
25 in the United states. The result was that Duplate Canada Limited 
of Windsor, Ontario, went out of business on January 28, 1972 and its 
26 
two hundred and ten employees lost their jobs. 
Former Ford president, Karl Scott, claimed that the Canadian 
content safeguard would provide Canadian parts suppliers with the 
opportunity to compete "for orders to supply every Ford plant in 
27 
North America". Mr. Scott's remarks notwithstanding, the govern-
ment, is well aware that even with the Canadian content safeguard, 
the parts producers in this country are severely hampered by the 
Automobile Agreement. D.C. Thorn is fully aware that "Americans buy 
2k 
J.D. Loveridge, Memorandum to the Honourable CM. Drury 
(March J, 1965). A copy of this memorandum was also sent to A.D. Hales 
M.P., who used this information in his Remarks to the Progressive 
Conservative Caucus Committee on Industry (Ottawa, March 26, 1965)• 
Editorial comment, The Windsor Star, January 21, 1972. 
26T,., Ibid. 
7K.E. Scott, Toronto Telegram, May 20, 1965. 
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U.S. parts", and this to such an extent that vehicle manufacturers 
in the United States will try to supply all their own parts "in 
house". Mr, Thorn also pointed out that the vehicle manufacturers, 
because of their original market power, can buy parts and keep 
minimum inventories, while at the same time demanding and receiving 
complete reliability of supply. 
Arnold Wallace, who is Vice-President of Earl Robinson 
Automotive Parts Limited of Oshawa, and who has been in the parts 
manufacturing and supply business for twenty years, says that not 
only have Canadian parts producers been hard pressed to compete with 
their American rivals in the United states, but also that the market 
29 in Canada for automotive parts is becoming smaller and smaller. 
For example, from 1965 to 1968 the Canadian deficit in trade with 
the United States in parts and accessories averaged $ 680 million 
per year. From 1961 to 196^ the average Canadian deficit in trade 
with the United States in parts and accessories averaged % ^+60 million 
per year. Both these factors Mr. Wallace attributes to the Automobile 
Agreement in its present form which requires only a base level of 
Canadian content. 
Mr. Wallace explained that for the last two years the "big 
four" car manufacturers have exceeded this basic level with the result 
28 
Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971. 
29 
Interview with A.J. Wallace, Vice-President of Earl Robinson 
Automotive Parts Limited, August 12, 1971. 
30 
C.E. Beigie, op.cit., p. o?. 
51Ibid., p. 71. 
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that they are "free to order virtually all of their additional 
requirements in either country without incurring customs duties". 
He added that the "big four" automobile assemblers can now satisfy 
the Canadian content safeguard simply through their payrolls and 
overhead costs. The net result, of course, is that Canadian vehicle 
manufacturers will not have to buy any parts in Canada when their 
parent firms can send these into Canada while meeting, in full, the 
requirements of the Agreement. 
Ford has now moved all its purchasing for engines and trans-
missions from Oakville, Ontario to Dearborn, Michigan. There is 
little chance, if the Duplate case is taken as an analogous example, 
that a Canadian manufacturer will be able to supply engines or trans-
missions to Ford of Canada or to Ford of the United States, since the 
personal relationship which the Canadian manufacturer utilizes is gone 
and since, as Mr. Thorn pointed out, the Americans purchase domestically 
33 
whenever they can. The American manufacturers tend to buy domestic-
ally for two reasons. First of all, the Americans truut and will 
therefore buy a part they require which is made in the United States, ! 
rather than a comparable part made elsewhere. The second reason for 
this habit, which is more tangible although not necessarily more 
important than the reason just mentioned, is that in many cases the 
firms producing these parts are subsidiaries of the automobile 
manufacturers or have exclusive contracts to produce parts for the 
Wallace Interview, August 12, 1971* 
'Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971* 
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automobile manufacturers. D.S. «Vood of the Automotive Parts 
manufacturers Association (Canada), noted in November, 1971 that 
"our members have to sell all their parts - both for local or United 
states consumption - to the United States headquarters of the Big 
Four. It's no good just beating the prices of United States 
35 
competitors by 1 or 2 percent." 
The Canadian parts manufacturers appear to be the only 
organized group dissatisfied with the Automobile Agreement. They do 
not for one moment say that the Agreement has not been lived up to 
fully on both sides of the border. They do say that the Agreement 
simply does not give them a chance. It was Mr. Wallace who put it 
best when he said: 
To compete with American parts producers, we must be prepared 
to do so on their home grounds, since, unlike the vehicle 
manufacturers, we do not receive a proportion of the annual 
increment in the North American market. Further to get 
contracts we must undercut U.S. prices by about 5 percent. 
The Automobile Agreement has left our industry stranded.-^  
It is impossible to ascertain whether it was lack of fore-
sight or whether the parts manufacturers were sacrificed by the 
Canadian government to obtain the Agreement in the first place, 
which has left parts manufacturers in the position described above. 
Officials both in the automobile industry and in the government 
agreed that foresight might have been lacking as the Agreement 
3^ 
Thorn Interview, August 3i 1971. 
•^D.S. Wood, Toronto Globe and Mail, November 2k, 1971. 
Wallace Interview, August 12, 1971. 
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affects parts manufacturers and, interestingly enough, no one denied 
that these same parts manufacturers were not originally sacrificed 
either. As I have mentioned above, the government has provided 
Transitional Adjustment Benefits for the parts manufacturers but 
these have been of little value in achieving the direct contact with 
the automobile manufacturers which is necessary to the parts producers 
to sell their products or in overcoming the tendency of American auto-, 
mobile manufacturers to buy their parts in the United States, In any 
event, a result of the Agreement is that a medium size plant, Ingersoll 
37 Machine and Tool, has no work for 800 men. 
A.D. Hales cited the Ingersoll case to the Conservative caucus 
and to the House of Commons because he wanted to point out that there 
were manufacturing concerns in Canada which were being adversely 
effected by the Automobile Agreement, and because he knew that the 
38 
Minister responsible, Mr. Drury, was aware of this particular case. 
Mr. Hales pointed out that he has always felt that the Agreement 
represented a step toward the loss of Canada' political birthright; 
but since it appeared to him that the automobile manufacturers in 
Canada would benefit as a result of the Agreement, he decided to focus 
his criticism of the Agreement on the distress of the parts manufacturer 
and to place the political responsibility for their distress on the 
37 
A.D. Hales, Remarks to the Progressive Conservative Caucus 
Committee on Industry (Ottawa, March 26, 1965). The Duplate Canada 
Ltd. case is a more up to date example of the same problem. In this 
instance, as cited above, 210 men lost their jobs in January, 1972. 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, March 19, 1965)1 
p. 12571. 
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Minister of industry, Mr. Drury. 
The roie of the automobile workers union only became 
apparent after the signing of the Agreement in 19&5. Not surprisingly 
perhaps, the United Auto Workers had no input into the negotiations 
in Ottawa beyond being informed that the government was attempting 
to reach an agreement with the United States government to expand 
the automobile industry in Canada. The U.A.W. in Canada and the 
United States supported the proposed Canada-United States negotiations 
and has supported the Agreement since it came into effect up to the 
present. The fact that the automobile union supports the pact is 
^1 
not difficult to understand. Obviously, the union depends on the 
manufacturer to require labour to produce automobiles and since the 
Agreement was designed to allow automobile manufacturers in Canada 
to be more efficient, the union saw itself as bound to benefit because 
of this, in the long run. Although the union supports the Agreement, 
the union interpretation of it has caused the Canadian government to 
have some serious second thoughts about the secondary implications 
of bilateral trade arrangements entered into with the United States. 
The former president of the U.A.W., Walter fieuther, presumably 
caught the Canadian government off guard when in May, 1967, he demanded 
59Hales Interview, February 18, 1971. 
ko 
Thorn Interview, August 3, 1971. 
"Report on Business", Toronto Globe and Mail, March 23, 1971. 
k2 
Thorn Interview, August 3i 1971. 
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that the Canadian U.A.W. member working in subsidiary automobile 
plants in Canada, which had American parents, should be paid the 
same wage as his United States counterpart. 
Mr. Reuther's statement also indicates a change in the 
structure of the international union. Just as the operation of the 
automobile manufacturers has become more integrated, so has the 
structure of the international U.A.W. become more integrated since 
the Automobile Agreement came into effect in 1965* Implicit in 
Mr. Reuther's statement is the assumption that the desires of the 
Canadian and United States membership are coincident and more important 
that these desires will be decided upon in the United States headquarters 
of the union. 
CM. Drury expressed both alarm and opposition to the U.A.W. 
proposal which he felt could have the effect of forcing up all wafes 
in Canada. Drury agreed with the business community which argued that 
only by paying lower wages, compared to those paid in the United States, 
can a Canadian industry compete with an American counterpart. It was 
pointed out by the Canadian business community that the average 
American factory worker earns about thirty percent more than a 
Canadian doing the same job, but that on the other hand the Canadian 
worker produces thirty percent lees per hour because the Canadian 
industry serves a smaller market and gets less efficiency due to 
short production runs. 
It is not surprising that Mr. Reuther gave this Canadian 
^Walter Reuther, The Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1967. 
Ibid. 
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argument short shrift since the Canadian government and automobile 
manufacturing industry negotiated the Automobile Agreement to over-
come this latter problem. Indeed the government and the manufacturers 
agreed in 19&5 and agree now that this very problem has been largely 
overcome as will be pointed out below. It is therefore, not any 
more surprising that Mr. Drury only threatened to take retaliatory 
measures against Mr. Reuther's demand for wage parity. It is 
difficult to see if the government could have taken action against 
the U.A.W.'s rather logical position despite the economic implications 
this had for other industries operating in Canada. 
The actual union-manufacturers agreement of 1967 provided 
for base wage parity, but the cost-of-living escalator clauses that 
formed part of the agreement, which in large measure produced ato "out" 
for the government, have subsequently produced an overall disparity 
in wages. Leonard Woodcock pointed out that in the next round of 
bargaining, which is due in 1973, the U.A.W. will push for complete 
wage parity with the cost-of-living escalator based on the United 
States cost-of-living index, ^  or a weighted composite index that 
combines both United States and Canadian price changes. Obviously, 
Mr. Woodcock sees the Automobile Agreement as having brought about 
an integrated North American manufacturing industry which should pay 
its workers uniform wages. He claims that overall wage parity can 
only be achieved through the use of a common index so as "to avoid 
continued strife and turmoil over wage disparities between the 
Leonard Woodcock, Toronto Globe and Mail, April 23, 1971* 
The 1967 cost-of-living escalator was based on the cost-of-living 
index in each country. 
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+^6 
Canadian and U.S. auto industries". 
To the government's great distress, wages in the automobile 
industry are now related, though not yet identical, to United States 
wages in the same industry rather than to the general wage level in 
Canada as a result of the Automobile Agreement. The government 
quarrels with the logic of the U.A.W., in part, because it does not 
want this unique situation to be applied to other industries, such 
as textiles, where there are branch plant manufacturers and inter-
national unions on the Canadian side of the border. Also, the govern-
ment wants to avoid "importing" United States inflation by using 
the United States cost-of-living index to determine Canadian wage 
scales. 
At the same time, the government recognizes the aspirations 
of the Canadian members of the U.A.W. D.C. Thorn said, "the issue of 
wage parity is not a zero sum game and I am torn when I consider how 
this particular issue can be handled". Mr. Thorn explained that by "non 
zero sum" he meant that he did not think that every time the 
American automobile worker got a raise that his Canadian counterpart 
would necessarily get an equivalent raise even though each man was 
doing the same job. The government seems inclined to be dissatisfied 
with the position taken by a union which supports the Automobile 
Agreement as designed and implemented in the first instance by the 
government itself. 
^6 
Leonard Woodcock, Toronto Globe and Mail, April 23, 1971< 
k7 
Thorn Interview, August 3, 1971. 
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The Automobile Agreement has given the international auto-
mobile workers union increased leverage with which to put substantial 
political pressure on the government. The U.A.W. has become a more 
integrated operation as a result of the Agreement and has bargained 
for wage parity for Canadian automobile workers based on a cost-of-
living which is common to its Canadian and American workers. Indeed 
collective bargaining was initiated on a continental basis in 1967 
48 
with the signing of the U.A.W.-Chrysler contract. 
As a result of the integration of the U.A.W. which was 
facilitated by the Agreement, and which has brought about the 
increased dominance of the United States U.A.W. over the Canadian 
U.A.W., the union has put political pressure on the Canadian government 
in that the government is restrained from devising policies designed 
to achieve Canadian political interests. The union objective of 
Canada-United States wage parity denies the possibility of a 
distinctly Canadian wage in the automobile industry in this country 
which is based on the Canadian cost-of-living index. The United 
States leadership has become more predominant over its Canadian 
counterpart, as North American bargaining has developed as a result 
of the Agreement. North American bargaining detracts from the 
Canadian identity which has been founded on east-west lines of 
communication. For example, the United States leaders of the U.A.W. 
considered the request of its members at Ste. Therese, Quebec to 
48
 r 
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 69. 
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use French as a working language in the plant expendable in its 
^9 
settlement with General Motors. There is a further important 
consequence of the Automobile Agreement for Canadian U.A.W. union 
members. The Automobile Agreement, which moves toward free trade 
in automobiles in North America, gives added authority to the 
American head of an American-based international union which has 
more than 100,000 Canadian members. The Canadian automobile workers 
naturally support an integrated U.A.W. to negotiate with a substan-
tially integrated industry, but even this has its costs. The 
Canadian union member has found that his American union leaders tend 
50 to have only a peripheral interest in uniquely Canadian union demands. 
Leonard Woodcock, who succeeded Walter Keuther, was rather 
blunt about this latter point when he stated in April, 1971 that the 
demand for wage parity in 1967 w a s made "on the grounds of equity 
51 
and also, frankly, to protect the jobs of our U.S. members". The 
reaction of Canadian U.A.W. members to Mr. Woodcock's statement was 
equally blunt. Larry Haiven, a Canadian U.A.W. member, said that 
kq 7Walter Reuther, The Wall Street Journal, June 2, 196?. 
The U.A.W. membership at the Ste. Therese plant considered the use 
of the French language in their plant to be an important issue, but 
since their contract was negotiated by the United States leadership 
of the U.A.W. this request did not receive the understanding nor sympathy 
it might have if the Canadian branch of the U.A.W. had been negotiating. 
independently with General Motors. The integration of the international 
U.A.W., brought about by the Automobile Agreement, contributed directly 




Leonard Woodcock, Toronto Globe and Mail, April 25, 1971. 
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Mr. Woodcock is obliged to favour the Agreement or "he'll be out of 
a job and he knows it", and that "as long as Canadian auto workers 
52 
are in the W.h.N. they can expect to be sold out". Speaking as 
the chairman of a group called "Canadians to Abolish U.A.W. Autopact 
Committee", Mr. Haiven indicated the need for an all-Canadian union 
and stated that this could only be achieved by ending joint United 
States-Canadian contract negotiations immediately and by demanding 
that "the federal government give notice it will end its part in the 
pact".5^ 
It is too early to tell how much of an impact Mr. Haiven's 
group will have since their position goes contrary to the policy of 
the United States leadership of their union and to the policy of the 
Canadian government, both of which want to retain the Agreement, 
although for very different reasons. It is clear, however, that 
some Canadian automobile workers are dissatisfied with their govern-
ment which negotiated the Agreement and with the dominant position 
that the American leadership of the U.A.W. has assumed as a result 
of the integration brought about within the union by the Agreement. 
The Canadian government is restrained from utilizing Canada's 
human resources in the automobile industry in this country to their 
full potential when, as a result of the Automobile Agreement, the 
leadership of the integrated U.A.W. announces that it is primarily 
interested in the jobs of its American membership. Thus, the political 
52 
Larry Haiven, The Windsor Star, June 26, 1972. 
55Ibid. 
pressure applied to the Canadian government by the automobile 
workers union is substantial, but at the same time, such pressure 
was invited and therefore probably inevitable, due to the integrative 
effect which the Agreement has had on the automobile industry as a 
whole, and indeed on the international U.A.W. 
CHAPTER III 
NATIONAL POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF 
THE AUTOMOBILE AGREEMENT 
This chapter deals with the "National Political Assessments 
of the Automobile Agreement". The objective of this chapter will be 
to examine the contrasting positions of the United States and Canadian 
governments regarding the Agreement. The term United States "govern-
ment" in this chapter refers to various American senators and some 
executive officials of the Johnson and Nixon administrations. 
Similarly the term "government" as it applies to Canada is used 
to describe the Liberal governments of Prime Ministers Pearson and 
Trudeau, as well as the public service, particularly the Departments 
of Finance, and Industry, Trade and Commerce. 
The American government has been opposed to the Automobile 
Agreement since it has become apparent to them that the production 
safeguards Canada wanted as part of the Agreement were to be of a 
permanent, rather than a temporary nature. It now appears that the 
United States government accepted the Automobile Agreement in 19&5 
because that government felt that the Agreement would evolve into 




industry sector. The American objections have gathered strength 
with the passage of time both in terms of the number of government 
officials raising their voices against the Agreement and in terms 
of the increasing frequency with which these objections have been 
voiced, it appears that the objections raised by these officials 
in the Johnson and Nixon Administrations would have been successful 
in radically changing, if not abrogating entirely, the Automobile 
Agreement long ago except for the fact that these government 
objections have not been supported by the automobile manufacturers 
2 in the United States. 
The reason the American manufacturers have not supported 
their government is that the Agreement has significantly improved 
the productivity of the industry in the American manufacturers' 
subsidiary operations in Canada. It is economically advantageous 
for the United States-owned industry to increase Canada's share of 
the automotive industry. Even without the support of its domestic 
automobile industry, the American government now objects to the 
Automobile Agreement to such an extent that the Agreement is a major 
item of trade disagreement in itself between Canada and the United 
States, and a source of continuing strain in the overall relationship 
between the two countries. As John Petty, Assistant Secretary of the 
See, United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, 
Hearings on H.H. 90^2 (w<ashin{ ton, September l*f, 15, 16, 20 and 21, 
1965). 
2 
As Mr. Hoy Bennett, President of Ford Canada, said "Oppositi 
to the Agreement does not have its origin in the industry, on either 
side of the border, the industry is very happy with the Agreement." 
Roy Bennett, Toronto Globe and Mail, November 19. 1970. 
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Treasury, told an International Monetary Fund meeting in September, 
1971, the Automobile Agreement and more specifically the abolition 
of the production safeguards in that Agreement is "a specific demand 
on Washington's part". Similarly, Peter Flanigan, a Special 
Assistant to the President on International Economic Policy, said 
that_the Nixon Administration wants "changes that work to the benefit 
of the United States". 
The American government's objections to the Automobile Agree-
ment have to do, in part, with the American perception of the objective 
of the Agreement. The Americans have insisted since 1965» that the 
purpose of the Agreement is to move both countries towards completely 
free trade in automobiles and automotive parts. The most notable 
advocate of this stance has been Senator Kussel B. Long of Louisiana, 
who is now the chairman of the United States Senate Finance Committee. 
Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana and former Senator Albert Gore of 
Tennessee are also notable supporters of the proposition mentioned 
above. To my knowledge, no Congressman nor anyone in an executive 
position in either the Johnson or Nixon administrations, including 
these two Presidents themselves, has said that the objective of the 
Automobile Agreement is not free trade between the two signatories. 
Senator Russel Long outlined this position when, in September 1965» 
he questioned Secretary of Commerce John Connor during the Senate 
•5 
-Vohn Petty, The Ottawa Citizen, September 29, 1971. 
it 
Peter Flanigan, The Windsor Star, November 13, 1972. 
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Committee on Finance Hearings regarding the Automobile Agreement. 
Senator Long asked Secretary Connor if the latter regarded the 
Automobile Agreement, "as one of those classic situations where 
free trade between two countries can benefit both countries", to 
which Connor replied in the affirmative. Secretary Connor noted 
that the Agreement as it stood in 196^ did not represent absolute 
free trade in the automobile industry, but that the Agreement was 
an "orderly constructive move toward free trade, 1 think this was 
the right move to make". Secretary of the Treasury John Connolly 
offered his support to this United States Administration proposal 
for free trade in the automobile industry of North America when he 
stated that the Canadian government ought "to permit private Canadian 
V 
citizens to import U.S. cars duty free." 
I 
The American povernment asserts that it accepted the Canadian } 
sales-to-production ratio and va1n^-added "safeguards" in 196!? on the -
assumption that these features wer« temporary. As Thomas Mann, former '• 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, explained to the Senate 
Committee on Finance, the United States administration agreed to the 
safeguards because the American gutomotive industry "is much more 
efficient than the Canadian industry" and that safeguards were "designed 
to help an infant industry in a transitional period until such time as 
See United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, 
Hearings on H.R. 90^2 (Washington, September Ik, lb, 16, 20 and 21, 
1965), P. 142. 
Ibid., p. lkj>. 
7 
John Connolly, The New York Journal of Commerce, February 11, 
1972. 
See United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, 
Hearings on H.R. 90^2, p. 184. 
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g 
it is able to compete." This assumption by the United States 
government is not valid, ihere is no statement in the Agreement that 
the productior safeguards (which are included in the Agreement under 
the headinp of Annex A) are to be of a temporary nature, D.C. Thorn, 
who was directly involved with the negotiations between the two 
governments, told me that he felt that the Canadian negotiators were 
far better prepared than their American counterparts when the Agree-
ment was being drawn up. In fact, Mr. Thorn went so far as to say 
that "the Canadian delegation out-negotiated the American team". 
Robert McNeill, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade Policy in 
the Department of Commerce, indirectly confirmed Mr. Thorn's assessment 
of the negotiations in his testimony to the Senate Committee on 
Finance. Mr. McNeill, who held an equivalent position to Mr. Thorn's 
on the American negotiating team, told the Committee that the matter 
of the Canadian production safeguards, which limit duty free impor-
tation of automobiles to qualifying Canadian manufacturers, only was 
"discussed, but this particular point was not negotiated." 
In light of these statements, it is my impression that the 
Canadian government negotiators allowed the American officials to 
believe that the production safeguards were a temporary feature of 
the Agreement without having to commit this understanding to writing 
Q 
See United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, 
Hearings on H.R. 90^+2, p. l&k. 
Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971* 
United States, Genate Committee on Finance, op.cit., p. l8j. 
•'s part of the formal Agr»ement. Further, the United states govern-
ment "iv; that •> + und^r^tood that the safeguards would be removed bv 
f'-jpada "•- r-onn •> this country's automobile industry bprump geared 
to North American production. John Connolly, Secretary of the 
T' "fifiur;/ "aid in "optember, 1971 that the United States Administration 
understood that the safeguards were "of a transitory nature a^'-'d that) 
12 
th3se ra^egunrds ou^ht now to be eliminated". I The United States 
government, specif"* rally the Departments of Commerce and Treasury, 
insists that the Canadian safeguards are no longer necessary in 
view of the fart that the Canadian automobile industry had, within 
one year afte^ the signing of the Agreement, been realigned for North 
American product-ion and that the rapid p-rowth of the Canadian industry 
13 
during the life of the Agreement underlines this fact. 
The United States government also argues that it signed the 
"preement with a view to attaininp a completely open border, as far 
as t^ade in automobiles is concerned, whereby the Canadian motorist 
would be able tc buy cars on either side of the border without a 
tariff being applied. T^e Americans arcue that United States 
Ik 
citizens have been able to do "ju^ t this since 196s. Tt is a 
unique situation when one can observe Senator ^arfke nrmiing that 
the Canadian automobile consume1" should have the same npht to buy 
12 
John Connolly, Toronto Star, September 2?, 1971. 
cf, John Connolly, I,a Presse, Septemb»r ?9, 1971. 
13 




15 his car where he pleases, as does his American counterpart. 
Senator Hartke'R political objections to the Agreement stem primarily 
from two sources. First, because of the integrative character of the 
Agreement several automotive parts manufacturers in hr. Hartke's home 
state of Indiana no longer have direct access to the automobile 
manufacturers which they supplied prior to the Agreement. Second, 
Senator Hartke objects to the Agreement because it is not symetrical 
in aoplication in Canada and the United states because of the Canadian 
safeguards. 
Many United States government officials are dissatisfied 
that the Canadian government has to date been unwilling to remove 
the production "safeguards" or to broaden the category of duty free 
importers to include individuals as well as manufacturers. Secretary 
of the Treasury, John Connolly expressed the Nixon adminstration's 
dissatisfaction with the Agreement when he stated that he expected 
17 that Canada would "at long last remove the production safeguards". 
Stated succinctly, a great many United States government officials 
agree with Senator Hartke's assessment of the Agreement, namely that: 
"what is being hailed as the most successful bilateral agreement in 
Canadian history is conversely one of the worst for the United States. 
15 . 
"United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, 
op.cit., 173 
16 Ibid., p. 185. 
17 
John Connolly, Toronto Daily Star, September 27. 1971. 
18 
Vance Har tke , The Ottawa J o u r n a l , February 20, 1969. 
lb 
Former Secretary of Commerce John Connor confirmed Senator hartke's 
assessment when he stated that United States production of automobiles 
19 for North America would decline "not in volume, but in percentages", 
ar, a result of the Agreement, John Petty, Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury, recently agreed with Senator Hartke's position when he 
stated that changes in the Agreement would be "a symbol in demonstrating 
a willingness co achieve balanced relations". The changes Mr. Petty 
referred to were the removal of the production safeguards which the 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury felt would not "have any material 
21 
effect on the automotive industry in either country". 
Interestingly enough senator Hartke feels that the Automobile 
Agreement is a bad arrangement for the united States because the private 
Canadian consumer cannot import an automobile from the United States 
duty free under the terms of the Agreement, while duty free treatment 
is accorded the private American consumer who imports a new car from 
22 Canada. What Senator Hartke is arguing for is the removal of the 
production safeguards which allow only Canadian automobile manufacturers 
to import automobiles from the United States duty free, or in other 
words, free trade between Canada and the United States in automobiles, 
which he feels would allow the United States to establish a larger 
19 
United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, 
op.cit., p. 176. 
John Petty, The Windsor Star, October 1, 1971. 
2L,., Ibid. 
22 
United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, 
op.cit., p. 1&5« 
trade «mrpius w~< th Canada in this commodity. 
TP«» American? vho qgree with Senator Hartke, such as John 
Connolly «nd John Petty, noint out that Canada has been abJe to main-
tain its position on the Automobile Agreement since Canada has become 
economically stronger, while the United States has become economica1ly 
Aeaker in the trade relationship between *"he two countries and that thi?. 
.-» dir^c* result of the Agreement. Certain trade facts do not lend 
tt,emselv°s to ttvs proposition, however. Over the seven years that t.h° 
Automobile Ap-reement has been ir> effect, Canada's cumulative deficit 
in automobile trade, including parts, amounts to i> 1.9 billion. 
Canada has h^d a surplus in auto trade with the United States for the 
oast two years, but that surplus now appears to be dwindling. In the 
overall trade relationship between the two countries Canada hTS 
traditionally had a deficit since outgoing payments to the United 
States for interest and dividends outweigh ony trade surplus that 
Canada might achieve. The overall trade deficit with the United States 
hap been smaller in the last two years, however, running at about 
% 600 million. There is little doubt that Canada's increase in 
automobile trade with the United States over the past seven years has 
reduced this deficit. Perhaps the most important thing to note at 
this time is not the figures mentioned above, which make a very good 
"Market Report", Toronto Daily Star, May 6, 197?. 
This report made use of statistics released by the Automotive Industry 




case for Canada, but rather that the American government thinks that 
the Automobile Agreement is doing a disservice to the overall trade 
relationship between the countries. No amount of statistics seems 
likely to sway the Americans from attempting to change what they 
2.5 
obviously think is a bad trade arrangement for them. 
The United States government favours a free trade arrangement 
with Canada in the automobile industry because it would increase the 
surplus in automotive trade which the United States presently has 
with Canada, but which has been declining since the Automobile Agree-
ment came into effect. Free trade in automobiles would undoubtedly 
bring about complete integration of the Canadian and American auto-
motive industries if their present status is taken as an indicator. 
It has already been pointed out that partial integration in the 
automobile industry, brought about by the Agreement has political 
disadvantages for Canada, since the locus of decision-making for the 
npsrati mwvf_ the inrlnci-ry-4-n—Canada is now more solidly entrenched 
outside Canada. North American production runs, the subordination of 
Canadian managers to managers of the parent operation in the United 
States, and the demand by an international union that its Canadian 
membership be paid according to a non-Canadian cost-of-living index 
all restrict the Canadian government from initiating economic policies 
which are designed to achieve Canadian political objectives such as 
25 
The American position is that the Agreement has brought 
about the reduction of the United States surplus in trade with Canada 
in automobiles and parts to & 600 million in 1970, and 1971. The 
American position ignores the # 1.9 billion surplus accumulated by 
the United States in automobiles and parts during the life of the 
Agreement. See Canada, Statistics Canada, Canada's Foreign Trade 
in Motor Vehicles and Parts (Ottawa, February, 1972). 
78 
east-west ties of commerce, the development of Canadian managers 
at an international business level, and distinctive wage policies 
based on the Canadian cost-of-living. Given these results of a 
partial free trade arrangement, one could expect that free trade in 
the automobile industry would lead, in all likelihood, to the removal 
of all decision-making regarding automobile production in this country 
from Canada with the result that the Canadian government would have . 
no direct political control over the operation of the automobile 
industry in Canada. Further, given the situation which has developed 
in Canada during the life of the Agreement, the evidence suggests that 
a bilaterial free-trade arrangement in automobiles and parts would 
bring about a substantial reduction in the manufacture of these 
commodities in Canada. Indeed, it is within the realm of possibility 
that the only manufacture of automobiles and parts that would take 
place in Canada under the terras of a free trade agreement would be 
that which could not be met by factories in the United States. The 
Canadian automobile industry would then be reduced to a distribution 
agency instead of continuing as a manufacturing concern. 
i 
The American government believes that the Automobile Agreement 
i 
has directly contributed to its balance-of-payment difficulties with ; 
I 
the result that the American government threw down the trade "gauntlet",! 
in the form of a ten percent import surcharge on August 1^, 1971. 
The ten percent surcharge did not directly affect the Automobile Agree-
ment, or other joint trade arrangements between the two countries, 
but it did bring such extensive pressure to bear on all other commodities 
that Canada exports to the United States, that it appeared by the end 
79 
of November, 1971 as if Canada was about to agree to changes in the 
Agreement. Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
announced on November 26, 1971, that Canada and the United States 
would "reach agreement reasonably soon on contentious points in the 
196^ pact," The contentious points Mr. Sharp referred to are the 
sales-to-production ratio, and the value-added safeguards. Secretary 
of the Treasury John Connolly left no doubt that the United States 
administration wanted Canada to drop the production safeguards when 
he stated in December, 1971, that "progress on existing trade 
27 
relations with Canada will be made". The Americans removed the ten 
percent surcharge on December 18, 1971, but the pressure against the 
Automobile Agreement was maintained through the formation of the 
Domestic International Sales Corporation in December 1971. Through ' 
the "DISC" program the American government allows United States-based 
companies to postpone payment of tax on up to one-half of their 
export earnings. In effect, "DISC" encourages multi-national enter-
prizes, such as the automobile manufacturers in Canada, to move more 
of their operations to the United States and export to other countries.. 
It seems likely that some, if not all, of the parent United States 
firms of the subsidiary automobile manufacturers in Canada will use 
"DISC" with the result that the Americans own balance-of-payments 
problems may, in large measure, be overcome despite the provisions 
of the Automobile Agreement. In April, 1972, it became apparent that 
"DISC" was going to have exactly this effect on the automobile 
Mitchell Sharp, Toronto Globe and Mail, November J>0, 1971. 
27 
John Connolly, Toronto Globe and Mail , December 20, 1971. 
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industry in Canada despite the provisions of the Automobile Agreement. 
Kdward Broadbent, the New Democratic Party Member of Parliament 
for the automobile producing constituency of Oshawa-tfhitby, asked the 
Minister of industry, Trade, and Commerce, Jean-Luc Pepin, if he was 
aware that the Ford and Chrysler companies in the United States were 
28 
using the "DISC" program. Mr. Pepin replied that he had no inform-
ation to this effect despite the careful documentation that Mr. Broadbent 
29 
provided with his questions. As a result of subsequent questions 
from Mr. Broadbent, the Minister revealed to the house of Commons that 
Ford and Chrysler were indeed using the "DISC" program in the United 
States. Outside the House of Commons Mr. Pepin agreed with 
Mr. Broadbent that the use of "DISC" by these two companies was a 
violation of the Agreement. In effect, the Minister of Industry, 
Trade and Commerce has admitted that the American government can alter 
its balance-of-payments position to its favour even in the automobile 
industry, despite the Automobile Agreement. 
The political significance of this revelation is that notwith-
standing trade statistics, which do not support their case, and the 
reasonableness and diplomacy of Mitchell Sharp and Jean-Luc Pepin, 




Canada, house of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April Zt, 1972), 
p . 17Jb 
31 ., 
Jean-Luc Pepin, The Ottawa Journal, April do, 1972. 
the American government is determined to change the Automobile 
Agreement to its greater advantage through political pressure, in the 
form of the "DISC" plan, if it is unable to alter the wording or 
sections of the Agreement itself. In a larger political context, the 
Automobile Agreement is instructive to the Canadian government in 
that through th"i s <>xperience it should realize that what the United 
,'fq+oc; p-overnment cannot get in writing in bilateral arrangements 
it win force through the poiiticai pressure at its disposal. 
The C~. .^ian government is more than satisfied that the Auto-
mobile Agreement has been a tremendous boon for this country. Indeed 
among the povprni<>nt officials I contacted there is unanimous agree-
ment wath f^nator Hartke's assessment that the Automobile Pact is, 
in terms of Canadian advantage, the "most successful bilateral 
32 ! 
agreement in Canadian history". 
From the beginning the Canadian government saw the Automobile 
Agreement not as a free trade arrangement between Canada and the United 
States, but rather as a means whereby Canadian production of auto-
mobiles would grow as the North American demand for automobiles ' 
(,vnanded. In th"5 s regard, my informants in the public service ap-ree 
that the Automobile Agreement has more than achieved what had been 
hoped for in ]9bf?. As Mr. Thorn put it: "the Agreement has worked 
3^ 
out better than expected"; Mr. Barr, who is responsible for the day 
to day operation of the Automobile Agreement, concurred that the* 
32 
Vance Har tke , Toronto Daily .Star, May 6 , 1972, 
'Thorn In t e rv iew, <\'irust 3» 19*71. 
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Agreement has benefited Canada "more than was expected". Mr. Thorn 
war, anxious to point out that the Agreement continues to be a success 
because thf» r.-i! es-to-production ratio guarantees that Canada will have 
an increasing share of the automobile market in North America. Thus, 
*he Canadian government is fully aware that this safeguard is the 
basis for the success of the Agreement in Canada, and at the same 
time it realizes that the American government as prepared to sacrifice 
the Agreement "in toto" if Canada does not rescind th** safeguards 
rrentioned above, as well as the value-added provision which has 
already been described. 
Mr. Bar*- provided further evidence that Canada is not 
i 
prepared to engage in free trade in automobiles with the United , 
States. He s^id that it was inconceivable that a trade paot in j 
I 
automobiLes could exist between Canada and the United States "if j 
35 i 
expanding production in Canada was not guaranteed in the pact". ; 
Mr. Thorn indicated that Canada was able to include the safeguards 
in the Agreement because the Canadians simply out-negotiated the 
Americans between October, 1964 and January, 1965. This hardly 
complements the American government's assertion (see above) that it 
was understood, at least on their part, that the Canadian safeguards 
were to be of temporary duration. My own assessment is that it is 
invariably the party that wants to change an agreement which claims 
that mutually agreed upon undertakings were repudiated subsequently 
34 
Barr Interview, August 3» 1971« 
55lbid. 
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by the other party. 
Despite the fact that there is no mention in the formaL 
Agreement that the Canadian safeguards were to be of a temporary 
nature, the p-overnment of the United States has informed the Canadian 
Fovernment that the United States signed the Agreement on the under-
standing that the Canadian safeguards would eventually be dropped. 
The American position is weak in terms of what Canada and the United 
States contracted for in the formal reading of the Agreement. 
However, because of the extensive economic ties between Canada and 
the United States and because of the relatively stronger United 
States position in the relationship, the American government is able 
to impress upon Canada that in politically-nepotiated bilateral trade 
arrangements puch as the Automobile Agreement, the expectations of 
the United States are as important as the formal signing of the 
Agreement. 
Canada is in no position to ignore the American expectations 
of the Automobile Agreement and is therefore faced with having to 
make a political decision from among three alternatives. Canada can 
change the Agreement to a free trade arrangement through the removal 
of the production safeguards; Canada can abrogate the Agreement, 
giving the United States a year's notice of the Canadian intention 
to do so; or Canada can resist the indirect pressure by the American 
government and maintain the Agreement in its present form. The 
Canadian government is most interested in an Automobile Agreement 
cf. Mitchell bharp, Toronto Globe and Mail, November 30, 
1971 and John Connolly, Toronto Globe and Mail, December 20, 1971. 
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which guarantees production in Canada and least interested in free 
trade in automobiles with the United States. 
further, Mr. Thorn pointed out that the Automobile Agreement 
had not established a precedent in Canada-United States trade 
relations but, rather, continued a trend which had begun with the 
establishment of the Defence Production ^harinp Agreement of I9'?fe. 
Indeed, Mr, Thorn went on to say that not only did he feel that the 
Automobile Agreement was the continuation of a trend in the right 
direction but, also that he favoured "further integration of Canada-
United States trade arrangements". Again Mr. Barr agreed, saying 
that without question the Agreement "represented a step forward 
since both automobile production and jobs in that industry have 
increased, both as a direct result of the Agreement." The 
Canadian deficit in the value of automotive parts has increased 
from & 576 million in 1964 to % 1 billion in 1968. The deficit has 
not been steady but does underline the complaints of the parta 
' Thorn Interview, August 3, 1971. 
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Barr Interview, August $, 1971. Mr. Barr is correct in his 
assessment that the Automobile Agreement has brought about an absolute 
increase in automobile production and in automotive industry jobs. 
In each case, however it should be noteu that a trade-off is involved 
which has allowed these increases to take place in Canada. Production 
of motor vehicles (i.e. automobiles and commercial vehicles) has 
increased in Canada from 671,018 units in 1964 to 1,19.5,572 units in 
1970, (see Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics: 42-001, Production 
of Motor Vehicles (Ottawa, July 19?1)). The increase is a dramatic 
one. At the same time, however, it should be noted that the decline 
in production of motor vehicle parts and accessories has been equally 
dramatic. The total amount of money spent on capital construction, 
which can be used as a measure of the expansion of the parts industry 
in Canada, has declined from $ 15,8 million in 1964 to % 9.^  million 
in 1971, (see Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics: 61-205, Capital 
and Repair Expenditures (Ottawa, May 1971)). 
manufacturers mentioned above and emphasizes the situation which Has 
occurred as a result of the manufacturers' ability to meet the 
Canadian "vaiu^-added" requirement of the Agreement, namely, that 
the growth of the parts industry in Canada is now curtailed. 
.Similarly, the United States trade balance in automotive parts 
39 
with Canada has increased by $ 385.2 million between 1964 and 1968. 
This represents a percentage increase of 55 percent over and above 
the trade surplus in automotive parts held by the United States prior 
to 1965. The pressure on the parts industry can be measured in 
another way. While the value of automotive parts exports from Canada 
40 has increased from » 73 million jn 1964 to )t 749 million in 1968, 
the value of automotive parts imports to Canada has increased from 
4l % 6^ +9 million in 1964 to % 1.8 billion in 1968. 
Similarly, there has been a definite increase in the number 
of Canadians employed in the automobile industry since the Automobile 
• * u • 42 Agreement came into being. 
39 
C.E. Heigie, op.cit., p. 87. 
40 
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics: 65-004 and 65-007, 
Value of Automotive Parts Trade (Ottawa, June, 1969). 
Ibid. 
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In 1964 the entire automobile industry, including the parts 
industry which experienced a decline in employment, employed 69,008 
Canadians, while in 1970 there were 82,024 people employed by the 
industry. The Agreement has therefore brought about an increase of 
13,016 jobs in Canada. This is hardly a "phenomenal" increase over 
the course of six years. These statistics were obtained through 
a telephone conversation with W.J. Patrick, Officer, Motor Vehicle 
Division, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Ottawa, 
February 11, 1972. 
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As a result of the economic advances made by the automobile 
industry in Canada since 196^ potential political opposition has 
been blunted for the most part. Drawing a parallel with the 
Reciprocity issue early in this century. Conservative critic 
A.D. Hales denounced the Agreement as a"return to lyil" when it 
was announced, but in light of the economic benefits which most 
pundits predicted for the Agreement (see the press reports in 
Chapter II) Mr. Hales' arguments failed to sway many Canadians. 
As a result, Mr, tiales and the Conservative party have changed 
their tactics. Mr. "ales and his Conservative colleague, Harold 
Danforth, who represents the Ontario automobile producing constituency 
of Kent-Essex, now assail the Agreement because of the harm it has 
done to some Canadian automotive parts manufacturers. This tactic 
has not touched a responsive chord in the Canadian electorate either. 
In fact, during the series of trade negotiations between Canada and 
the United states in the past five years, the Conservative party has 
not suggested that the Automobile Agreement is a major irritant, 
presumably because the Conservatives are interested in perpetuating 
the advantages occurring to manufacturers through the Agreement, but 
rather that, the Liberal government hap been inept in handling these 
negotiations. 
The position of the New Democratic Party has also changed 
A.D. Hales, Hamilton Spectator, May 8, 196b, 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, M*y 4, 196"?), 
pp. 892-893. 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, December 15, 
1971), p. 1048^. ' 
*7 
siT-e 196^. Former M.P. Reid Scott's anxiety over the plight of 
dislocated automobile workers was logical enough, in that the New 
Democratic Party claims to speak for labour, but largely overcome 
by the government through the introduction of" the Transitional 
Adjustment Benefit program in September, 1%^. The present New 
Democratic Party critic of the Agreement is Kdward Broadbent who 
represents the constituency of Oshawa-Whi+by, the major industry of 
which is automobile production. Mr. Broadbent does not attack the 
Agreement as a whole since this course would potentially have disastrous 
political effects for Mr. Broadbent personally as the Agreement has 
maintained and slightly increased the employment of his constituents. 
Mr. Broadbent's prospects of re-election would not be enhanced by 
criticizing even indirectly, the main employer of his constituents. 
The present position of the New Democratic Party, as articulated by 
Mr. Broadbent, is that the Droduction safeguards contained in the 
Agreement are not stringent enough. Specifically Mr. Broadbent 
arpues that value-added percentage of Canadian equipment used in new 
cars should be 100 percent. This tactic has similarly elicited 
little response either from the government or from the public. 
Mr. Broadbent's revelation that the parent companies of Ford and 
Chrysler in the United States are using the "DISC" program caused 
some embarrassment for the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 
Canada, house of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, June 28, 1965), 
p. 2911. 
k7 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April 13, 3972), 
p . 1715. 
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Jean-l.uc Pepin, hut the concern of both men was essentially the same, 
namely: that the "DISC" program when used by American automobile 
48 
manufacturers is a violation of the Automobile Agreement. 
The political opposition has been unable to mount an effective 
campaign of criticism against the Agreement largely because such 
arguments concern Canada's long term political interests and the 
need for the development of an industrial strategy in this country. 
When these arguments are compared to the immediate and potentially 
short-lived benefits, which the Agreement has brought to Canadian 
automobile manufacturers, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
Agreement is not and has no prospect of becoming a political issue in 
itself while it is in effect. The Agreement is only likely to become 
an issue in itself if the Canadian government were to meet the United 
States demand for the removal of the production safeguards. The 
political opposition seems not to have considered the implications 
of the integration which has taken place since 196^. One consideration j 
! 
involves the relationship of Canadian jobs in the industry in Canada ' 
t 
I 
to the vehicles these workers produce for the North American market. { 
To use an example which has previously been cited, if Ford were 
to experience P decreased demand for its Maverick, the company could 
of course, be expected to cut back production on that model line. 
Ford's subsidiary operation in Canada manufactures the Maverick and 
if cutbacks were required, it would not be surprising- to see Ford of 
48 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, Apr i l 28 , 1972), p. 1715. 
^9 Shelley Interview, July b, 1971. 
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Canada's parent firm in the United States order a shutdown in Canada 
before throwing any of its workers involved in production of the 
Maverick in the United States out of work. 
Thus the Automobile Agreement has brought about an increase 
in the number of jobs available to Canadians in the automobile 
industry, although that increase his not been spectacular. At the 
same time the Agreement has subjected these jobs, through increased 
production integration, to the marketing decisions of a parent 
company which is likely to consider its Canadian employees as a 
secondary consideration if it does not consider them as simply being 
expendable. The Massey-Ferguson layoff of February, 1971, provides 
an example of what may be a continuing trend. At that time, the decision 
to cut back on production in North America by the United States head 
office led to the layoff of _5!?0 American workers at the Massey-
Ferguson parent plant and the layoff of 1,200 workers at the Canadian 
50 
subsidiary plant. 
The Massey-Ferguson experience is in .some ways analogous and 
therefore instructive about the situation which exists in the 
automobile industry as a result of the Agreement. The farm machinery 
industry in Canada operates under North American free trade, whereas 
the automobile industry does meet production requirements. In both 
cases, however, production is set up accordinp- to North American 
/ demand due to the integration which has developed in each industry. 
f 
In the automobile industry, it is possible that Canadian workers 
"Massey-Ferguson Announces Layoff", l'oronto_Daxly Star, 
February 10, 1971. ~"" ~ 
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rould benefit if North American demand increases for the models 
they are producing. The point is that in both industries the jobs 
of Canadian workers are related to North American demand, rather 
than Canadian demand and that when North American demand declines , 
in an integrated industry, Canadian workers will likely suffer job,' 
/ 
losses out of proportion to their American counterparts. Therefore, 
the relation of Canadian empJoyment to North American demand, which 
results from these Canada-United states trade agreements does not 
serve the Canadian political interest of developing east-west 
commercial ti«*s nor the maximum utilization of Canadian human 
resources when these resources tend to be more responsive to demana 
for their need, which exists primarily outside of Canada. 
The Canadian government, both before and after the Automobile 
Agreement came into effect, has kept a close watch on the price gap 
between cars sold in the United States and cars sold in Canada. 
The price that a Canadian has paid for his car has always been higher 
than that paid by his American counterpart. Since the inception of 
the Agreement the Canadian government has hoped, and in some cases 
predicted, that this gap would be narrowed if not entirely eleminated 
as a result of the market advantages which the Agreement would facili-
tate, in 1970 Canadians paid from 3 to j>.5 percent more (or about 
L>1 i» 13b) for a similar car model than did Americans. This represents 
the smallest disparity which has been achieved during the seven year 
life of the Agreement. In 1966 for example, the Canadian consumer 
paid 5 percent more for the same model of car than did the American 
rt.J. Patrick, op.cit., (Ottawa, February 11, 1972). 
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consumer, 
Canadian government officials have cited various reasons for 
the difference in prices. D.C. Thorn explained that the national 
sales tax Ln Canada of h percent (the rate was [?. percent four years 
ago) was one of the reasons that a price difference exists between 
Canada and the United states, as well as the fact that replacement 
parts are more expensive in this country. Kepiacement parts are 
not included under the terms of the Agreement as 1 have pointed out 
above, so the Canadian Automotive Parts industry supplier * hi ^  
market in C"iada. Since the potential market is sma ' I T in Canada 
thin the United States, n Canadian automotive partr ^rripany is unable 
to achieve the longer Rnd therefore more economical production runs 
that its American counterpart can achieve. Therefor^, the more 
expensive production costs in Canada result in highe*- vrA "es *"or 
parts kept in stock by automobile manufacturers and others which are 
uijed as other than original equipment. Since the automobi Le manu-
facturer must maintain a stock of replacement parts, the increased 
"osts of these parts in Canada is passed on to the new car consumer. 
Mr. Barr agreed that the Canadian national sales tax is a 
contributing factor to the price difference, but he added that 
distribution in Canada is more expensive than in the United States 
53 
and thereby also contributes to the price gap. ^oth men agreed 
that the "pegged" Canadian do]Lar, which had been set at 92.5 cents 
5? 
Thorn Interview, August 3, 1971* 
53 
Barr Interview, August 3, 1971. 
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American was also a contributing factor to the price difference. The 
Caridi?n dollar has been Hoatinp freely since June 1, 1970, and 
during the first quarter of 1972 was valued at % 1.01 and % 1.02 in 
United states funds. Theoretically, the pri-e of an automobile 
comi OF into Canada under the terms of the Ap-reement should cost less 
to the Ganad-inn consumer if the Canadian dollar is worth one to 
two cents more than the United States dollar. The evidence suggests 
that in spite of the Agreement it is stili more expensive to produce 
a car in Canada as compared to the United States, even though the 
government of Canada has consistently claimed that it negotiated the 
Agreement to overcome this very discrepency. 
Tn 197i, the Automobile Apreement and explanations of govern-
ment officials nothwithstandinp, the averape price difference rose to 
over 8 percent, and the Canadian government is clearly concerned. 
John Turner, Minister of Finance, announced on April 26, 1972, that 
he would ask the major car manufacturers in Canada to be more specific 
in the economic reasons which have been piven for this increase. 
James Dykes, who speaks for the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association 
replied that hipher Canadian automobile prices in 1971 were due to 
increased production costs in this country and to the fluctuation of 
bb the Canadian dollar. In view of the government's assessment of the 
effect of the price differential of the "pepped" Canadian dollar, 
Mr. Dykes' latter argument would seem to be suspect. Mr. Turner's 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April 26, 1972), 
p. 16^6. 
bb 
" J a m e s Dykes,__Toronto DaiJ.y_ S t a r , April 26 , 1972. 
announcement that he would seek an explanation for the rise in tfhe 
price differential for cars indicates that the government is not 
satisfied with explanations offered by the automobile industry or by 
the government itself. The government seems to feel that it has taken 
the steps, such as the reduction of the national sales tax and the 
floating of the dollar, required to reduce the price difference between 
cars purchased in Canada and the United States and it seems to want to 
know why a result opposite to what it has expected has occurred. 
The government apparently sees the Agreement as a means of 
narrowing the price gap between similar models of cars in Canada 
and the United States, but not as the instrument to eliminate this 
gap. The automobile industry claims that even with the Agreement, 
automobile production is more expensive in Canada than in the United 
States, so that higher prices must be charged in this country to 
compensate for the difference in production costs. The government 
recognizes the original market power of the automobile industry and 
so has claimed that the Automobile Agreement has been worthwhile in 
that until 1971 the price gap had been steadily narrowed. The price 
gap in 1971 was at the same level as it was in 196^ when there was no 
Automobile Agreement. The government will call for the car manu-
facturers to explain but neither the government nor the Agreement is ' 
likely to effect a roll back in the price of cars in Canada. The 
automobile industry sets the price for the production and the sale 
of its products and the government is prepared to let the industry 
continue to do so even if it means not talking about this particular 
aspect of the "most successful bilateral agreement in Canadian history". 
9k 
The evidence of the government's pouture in this regard is 
two-fold. First of all, Mr. Turner has said only that he will ask 
the automobile manufacturers to explain the widening pric* difference. 
He has Riven no indication that the government is contemplating 
requesting the automobile manufacturers in Canada to roll back 
their prices. Second, the budget which the government presented 
to the House of Commons on May fe, 197^ provided incentives for the 
expansion of all industry in Canada including the automobile 
industry. Mr. Turner's approach appears to encourage the pricing 
policy of the automobile industry, rather than hoLding the industry 
accountable for its prices in Canada. Mr. Turner's budget is, in 
part, a political attempt by the Liberal povernment to counter th*> 
"DISC" program of the United states which has affected the automobile 
industry in Canada despite the existence of the Agreement. lf seems 
apparent that the United States brought the "DISC" program into 
being to rectify balance-of-trade problems such as those that the 
united States government was experiencing with Canada under the 
terms of the Automobile Agreement. This aspect will be discussed 
further below. At the same time the budget encourages integration 
within the automobile industry which was initiated by the Automobile 
Agreement. The government has invited, implicitly, a pricing policy 
in the automobile industry which is set on a North Ameriran basis. 
A North American pricing scheme which is established outside Canada, 
" See, for instance, statements made by Secretary of the 
Treasury John Connolly, Toronto Globe and Mail, December 20, 1971. 
but which is anplied to this country, undermines the Canadian 
government's capacity to implement independent tax and monetary 
policies which is a phenomenum counter to Canada's long term 
political interest. 
The most immediate concern of the government with regard to 
the Automobile Agreement is the way in which the United States 
"DISC" program can circumvent the Agreement, entirely. Jean-Luc 
pfpin, the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce has stated 
57 that "DJ5>C" breaks the Canadian-United State*- lutomobile Agreement. 
Chrysler and ford informed Mr. Pepin on April twenty-seventh and 
April twenty-eighth, respectively, that their parent companies in 
b8 the United States have been using "DISC" since December 1971. 
Through the use of "DISC" the United States automobile manufacturers 
can circumvent the Automobile Agreement in two ways. First, the 
American companies can use the tax benefit to reduce their prices 
in Canadian markets. Second, "DISC" can lure production by United 
States subsidiaries in Canada back to the United States and at the 
same time damage Canadian sales in third countries, where American 
automobile manufacturers have the benefit of "DISC". Father of 
these courses undertaken by Chrysler and Ford, or both of them, 
would without doubt, cause a substantial surnlus in trade m auto-
mobiles in favour of the United States which would be unaffected by 
the Automobile Agreement. The options open to the Canadian government 
57 
Jean-Luc Pepin, The Ottawa Journal, A.pril 29, 1972. 
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Canada , House of Commons, Deba t e s ( O t t a w a , A p r i l 2 8 , 
1 9 7 2 ) , p . 171s?. 
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are limited until the true effect of the "DISC" prop-ram can be 
measured on the automobile industry in Canada. 
The Canadian government can invoke countervailing duties 
if it proves that the reduced prices available to American manufacturers 
in Canadian markets seriously damages local Canadian industry. It 
is also posbible for Canadian customs officials to block, on thp 
instructions of the government, the entry into Canada of automobile 
manufacture^ which have benefited under "DISC". This latter course 
is virtually -impossible in a logistic sense so that, in fact, it is 
more a theoretical option than a real one. This is so because a 
Canadian customs official at a Canadian port of entry has to make a 
decision on the spot as to whether or not specific manufactures coming 
into Canada fall under the overall terms of the Automobile Agreement. 
The problem here then is not having the time to examine the great 
volume of automobile manufactures coming into the country with a view 
of ensuring that the terms of the Agreement are not being broken. 
A more important reason explaining why it is so difficult 
to prevent automobile manufactures from coming into Canada after 
having been subsidized in the United States by "DiiiC" is that the 
United btates government has so far refused to provide Canada with a 
list of American companies sending automobile manufactures into Canada 
using the "DliiC" program. The Department of Industry,Trade and 
Commerce has only been able to ascertain that Ford and Chrysler are 
using "DloC" by requesting this information from the subsidiaries of 
Jean-Luc Pepin, The Ottawa Journal, April 29, 197^* 
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these two corporations in Canada. It is difficult indeed for a 
customs official to identify first of all which companies in the 
United otates are using "DliiC" to send specific automobile manu-
factures into Canada and second, to designate which imports of 
the huge volume coming into Canada fall outside the terms of the 
Agreement and are therefore subject to duty. It is also unlikely 
that Canada would apply countervailing duties on automotive products 
since this step wouLd likewise be tantamount to breaking the 
Agreement. 
The "Dl^C" program, as it applies to the automobile industry 
is the United btates government's attempt to ensure that the United 
.States will regain and hold its surplus in automobile trade with 
Canada without directly altering the Automobile Agreement. The 
Canadian government responded to "DISC" with the budget proposals 
of May 8, 1972. The government has offered substantial tax conces-
sions to all manufacturers in Canada, including automobile manufacturers, 
and automotive parts manufacturers, who invest in new capital equipment 
which will expand production and increase efficiency. The Canadian 
government has met the American government's attempt to circumvent the 
Agreement with incentives that do the same type of thing as the "DIbC" 
program was designed to do, for the tax concessions to manufacturers 
announced in the budget on May tt, also effectively circumvent the 
Automobile Agreement itself. 
Canada, house of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April 28, 1972), 
p. 1715-
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, May 6, 1972), 
p. 2001. 
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The political repercussions resulting from this move and 
counter move, namely the United states government's "DISC" prop-ram 
and the Canadian government's May 8, 1972 budget proposals, have 
been minor. The Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce may have 
suffered some embarrassment in that an opposition Member of 
Parliament (Edward Hroadbent) brought forth information to the public 
which Mr. Pepin did not seem to have, namely, that two American 
automobile manufacturers were using the "Drsc" program. The opposition 
did rot call for the *-esigmtion of Mr. Pepin and neither the govern-
ment no1" the opposition "ailed for the abrogation of the Automobile 
Agreement by ranada. Tndeed the government and the opposition seem 
determined to retain the economic benefits brought about by the 
Agreement without giving outward consideration to the affect the 
Automobile Agreement har on Canada's long term political interest 
and nn the development of long range industrial strategy. 
It might appear from the discussion in the preceding chapter 
that the Canadian and American governments have reached an impasse, 
or at least, have been unable to alter the Automobile Agreement via 
normal negotiations. The Automobile Agreement, similar to most 
facets of the relationship which exists between Canada and the United 
States, is nothing if not dynamic. 
The United States government is determined that the Agreement 
should evolve into a free trade arrangement in automobiles and parts 
with Canada ard is prepared to apply substantial political pressure, 
in the form of the "DISC" program, to bring about this desire. The 
Canadian government is satisfied with the Agreement and determined 
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to resist American pressure an evidenced by the May 8, 1972 budget 
response to the United .Staters "DISC" program. For the time being, 
the Agreement itself remains intact and has important political 
consequences for Canada, The following chapter deals with the 
politi-al consequences that the Automobile Agreement has for Canada. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
AUTOMOBILE AGREEMENT 
The goal of this chapter is to review the political issues 
and implications associated with the Agreement. These include the 
passage of the Agreement by an order-in-council, the difficulty 
the Liberal government has had in explaining the reasons why the 
Agreement has not brought about parity in the prices that Canadian 
and American retail consumers pay for their automobiles, and the 
political effects of the continental rationalization of the 
automobile industry as encouraged by the Agreement. 
The chapter also deals with more recent political implications 
of the Agreement such as the United States import surcharge provisions 
and "DISC" program and the subsequent Canadian responses to these 
measures. Further, the chapter will survey the political issues of 
wage parity in the automobile industry and the more nationalistic 
outlook of the Canadian branch of the United Auto Workers both of 
which have arisen as a result of the Agreement. This section also 
considers the nature of the political opposition to potential changes 
in the Agreement in the House of Commons, a summation of the author's 
views on the future of the Agreement itself and the instruction which 
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the Agreement provides for the future of Canada and Canadians. 
The Canadian government has been criticized by the Progressive 
Conservative Opposition for bringing the Automobile Agreement into 
effect in 19^ lb by order-in-council rather than allowing a full debate 
in Parliament. This issue is a moot point. A full debate of the 
Automobile Agreement before Parliament, in my opinion, would have 
only delayed the Agreement from becoming law as soon as it did. In 
196^ the Canadian government felt that the automobile industry was 
not contributing its potential to the Canadian economy as a whole, 
despite the fact that the industry constituted then, as it does now, 
one of the most important single sectors of the economy. The govern-
ment designed the Automobile Agreement to allow the industry to 
increase its output, improve its export performance, and provide 
i more jobs for Canadians. Trade arrangements of this type between 
Canada and the United States have always prompted Canadian critics 
to point out, often with justification, that the Canadian government 
has arranged another "sell out", such as in the case of the Columbia 
fiiver Treaty and in some of the energy resources trade arrangements. 
It has been pointed out, in an unconvincing way, that an 
2 
order-in-council is "a standard parliamentary procedure". A minority 
cf. The testimony of General A.G.L. McNaughton before, 
Canada House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and 
National Defence (Ottawa, 196^). 
Thorn Interview, August 3i 1971« 
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government with memories of the Pipeline I>.:h.i<-p still fresh in its 
mind would have been unwise politically to risk a full scale debate 
in Parliament even over an agreement as important as the automobile 
3 
trade pact." Furthermore, a full debate may have forced the govern-
ment to reveal not only to the opnosition but also to the United 
States administration that the sales-to-prndur^ion and value-added 
safeguards were to be a permanent feature of the Automobile Agree-
ment. Such a revelation would have probably killed the ratification 
of the Agreement by the United states Congress, since as has been 
pointed out, most United States politicians regard the Automobile 
Agreement as the first step toward free trade in the automobile 
industry between Canada and the United States. If the Conpress had 
felt in 19bb that the production safeguards were to be a permanent 
feature of the Agreement, it would have undoubtedly not passed the 
k 
Agreement into law. The critics in Canada were most severe as it 
was; but it is unlikely that the continuation or even the abrogation 
of the Automobile Agreement tomorrow would br-ing about a general 
election, much less the defeat of the government. Tn .Januarv, 1965, 
however, both of these possibilities were distinct. Therefore, an 
order-in-coun^il was the only expedient that the Liberal Government 
felt it had nt its disposal in order to remain in power and to 
'The Liberal government lost the general election in 1957 
partly because of its alleged arrogance in cutting off all debate in 
Parliament on the method of financing and construction of the Trans-
Canada Pipeline. See William Kilbourn, P^pe Line(Toronto, 1970), 
pp. 111-133. 
United States Congress, Senate Committee Finance, Hearings 
(Washington, September Ik, 15, 16, 20 and 21, 1965). 
br-np the Agreement into effect in Canada with the least possible 
political furor occurring as a result. 
The government has had difficulty in giving an adequate 
explanation for the fact, that <~ar prices in Canada are hicher than 
in the United States, Often the explanation."-; are similar if not 
redundant and when compared to those offered by the automobile 
industry they are contradictory. The Automobile Apreement may 
have narrowed the price pap, although this argument is susoect 
due to the fact that the cap in 1971 widened to the pre-Apreement 
level. There is another explanation for the price gap other than 
those mentioned above which was never specifically stated, but was 
inferred to mo by my informants in the public servic», The Auto-
mobile Apreement is a partial free trade arrangement and as such 
hrts facilitated partial integration of the automobile industries 
in Canada and the United States. The two safeguards which Canada 
idded to the Apreement assure Canada of a specific level of indigenous 
automobile manufacturing, without complete integration- One result 
of the safeguards, it seems, is a slightly hipher price for auto-
mobiles purchased in Canada. It can bvi argued that an additional 
tt 2^0 for an automobile is not too high a price to pay to ensure 
that the Canadian automobile industry continues to operate as more 
than a mere distributing agent for a parent manufacturing company. 
Without the production-to-sales ratio and value-added safeguards the 
'Canada, house of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April, 26, 1Q72), 
p. I64n. 
W.J. Patrick Interview, February 11, 1972. 
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ovpntuality mentioned above is not beyond the realm of Dossibilitv. 
Th<* Canadian government, however, is deserving of censure for not 
having the <-?indor to state that Canadians are required to pay a 
price to ensure that wholly-owned subsidiary operations such as 
those which constitute the automobile industry, continue to 
manufacture in this country under the terms of even n partial free 
trade agreement as it applied to North American automobile production. 
1 would say that this nrice is reasonable as long as Canada does not 
hove an indigenous automobile industry. 
One of the reasons that the Canadian government negotiated 
thf* Automobile Agreement was to rationalize the automobile industry, 
stated succinctly, the government agreed with Canadian manufacturers 
that "too many model lines were being produced for too small a domestic 
market". The Canadian safeguards added to the Agreement 3llowinp- the 
rationalization of the automobile industry has meant that far fewer 
model lines are manufactured in Canada than previous to the Agreement, 
it is possible then that these cars would be manufactured in C-inadq 
even though there might not be any Canadian demand for these modejs. 
Conversely, the production of these particular models might cease 
entirely if there were only a Canadian demand for them or the 
Canadian demand might be met by manufacture in the United States 
only. The Automobile Agreement has made this type of nationalization 
possible. If the Automobile Agreement is abrogated, the rational-
ization it facilitated will have left the Canadian automobile consumer 
Thorn interview, August 5» 1971. 
with a smaiier model choice than was available before the Agreement, 
a choice which may or may not meet Canadian driving needs. An 
atLempt. to provide a wider ranpe of models by Canadian manufacturers 
will bring about the inefficiency which was so apparent in the 
industry before 1961?. The continental rationalization of the 
automobile industry has reinforced continental advertising of 
automobiles. Thus Canadians are urged to buy larger cars in the 
s*3me way that Americans are despite what seems to be the marked 
Canadian preference for compact cars. The effect of this 
relentless United States-b^sed advertising is the erosion of 
distinctly Canadian tastes and vicariou^y the Canadian political 
nationality. 
By promoting continental rationalization thro'Jfh the Auto-
mobile Agreement, the Canadian government has also brought about 
some morp tangible results. Since automobile production is now 
g-eared to North American requirements, production derisions are 
left virtually completely to the head offices of the automobile 
manufacturers based in the United States. The result for the 
Canadian government is that its leverage with regard to anti-
combines legislation and/or cases of jxtra-territoriality is even 
less meaningful than it was before the Agreement came into effect 
and in fact such leverage may now be effectively reduced to the 
point where Canada is limited to making protests which neither the 
8 
automobile industry nor the American government is likely to he^d. 
l.A. l.itvak, op.cit., p. 159. 
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The Automobile Apr^ement, by partially integrating the nroduction 
of automobiles in North Am^ri-a, reinforces the notion that the 
United -States Treasury Department has a legal right to prohibit 
or at least to scrutinize the Canadian export of automobiles or 
trucks which include United States-origin parts to third 
9 
countries. Indeed such a case has already occurred as the 
Treasury Department held up the sale of Ford of Canada trucks to 
the Peoples Kepuoiic of China in 1%7.' 
Similarly, the Automobile Agreement represents the 
recognition by the Canadian government that, to cite a specific 
example, Ford of Canada'R parent company in the United States has 
the prerogative to decide which automobi Le models Ford of Canada 
will produce in North America, as well as the prerogative to decide 
what market rights Ford of Canada has in the rest of the world. 
Thr example of the North American production of the Maverick by Ford 
of Canada has already been cited. For example, Ford of Canada has 
market rights in ail British Commonwealth countries except for the 
United Kingdom with the remainder of the world being reserved for 
the parent United States Ford Company. 
Further, the jobs of Canadian workers may now be tied 
9 
See, United States Treasury, Congressional Federal Kecord, 
Title j>L, Foreign Assets Control Kegulations: ^00,204; and 0^0,j5?? 
(Washington, 1969)* 
Canadian House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, December lfc, 
I9b7), P. 251**. 
Ford Motor Company of Canada, Articles of incorporation 
(Oakville, 1906). 
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directly to marketing decisions which originate in the United States 
and subsequently on the continental sale of the model lines these 
workers produce. It has already oeensh^'vn above that when a North 
American industry covered by free trade, such as the farm implements 
industry, slumps it is likely to be the Canadian workers who are 
laid ol'i first. 1 have rited the exampLe of how Maesey-Ferguson 
dealt with a general production cutback in february, 1^71, by 
laying off 1,200 workers at its Canadian subsidiary operation while 
only ihQ were laid off at the wassey-Ferguson parent company in the 
12 
United states. 
Another tangible result is that the Canadian government has 
come to realize after ^resident Nixon's economic moves on August i^ >, 
l^Vl, that it cannot discuss the Autouiotaiie Ap-reement with the United 
states in isolation from other trade inters between the two "ountriep, 
'Pre Canad^-ir p-overnment has fonnd thaf rationalizing ^ s own automobile 
industry is directly related to its entire trading relationship with 
the Un*ted States, especially when the Americans consider that by so 
doing the Canadians have hoodwinked their "neighbours" into pcceptinr 
what the American government considers to be an ursati-.factory 
arrangement. 
It is dif'icult to imagine that the Canadian government was 
naive enough to beijeve that the Automobile Agreement would l-'st 
forever. No matter what happens to the Ap-reement, the rationalization 
of the Canadian automobile industry has barked the government into a 
"Massey-Ferguson Announces Layoffs", Toronto Daily .Star, 
February 10, 1973. 
corner. On the one hand the government has removed itself still 
further from havinr uny direr*- influence on the indurtry's 
production decisions for this country and their effect bemuse of 
the integration which tns occurred as a resuLt of the Apreement. 
On the other hand, if fhe ^rreemont were ended Canadians generally 
would have fewer models from which to choose. The automobile 
industry in Canada would be in the same position as it was before 
1965 except that it would hove a substantially narrower range of 
products to offer to its Canadian customers and no competitive 
access to the American market. This development might be advan-
tageous if the effective decision-making for the automobile industry 
in this country were patria*ed. There is no guarantee th^t these 
circumstances would take pl«c«> upon the abrogation of the Agreement 
or if they did, +o what extent they might be ndvantageous. 
The Canadian government learned on August IS, 1971 . that 
even bilateral agreements such as the Automobile Agreement are 
indirectly affected when the American government turns inward to 
stimulate its domestic manufacturing industries. The Automobii0 
Agreement and the products it exempts from duty in Canada and the 
United States were not directly affected by the imposition of the 
10 percent surcharge on imports announced by President Nixon in 
August, 1971. The Canadian government is well aware, and has been 
lor some time, that the United States Administration is dissatisfied 
with the Agreement as it exists. There can be little doubt that the 
measures taken on August IS, 1971, though world-wide in design, 
served to put particular pressure on Canada for the purpose of 
altering this specific irritant to the United States, i.e., the 
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Automobile Agreement. 
The timing of ^resident Nixon's announcement is important. 
Trade taJks between Canada and the United States had already been 
scheduled for the first two weeks of November, 1971. and one of the 
primary topics to be discussed at these meetings was th» Automobile 
Ap-reement, The surcharge did not affect the Agreement directly, 
but it did affect all but a few sectors of the trade between the 
two countries so that in effect, Canada was invited by the 
application of the surcharge to make trade concessions to the United 
.States which would be negotiated at the .joint meeting. From the 
Canadian response to fresiuent Nixon's measures it can be implied 
that revision of the Automobile Agreement was one of the trade con-
cessions that the United .States Administration wanted Canada to make. 
I7: 
The Canadian government's response was threefold. F^rst, 
the povernment made its traditional pilgrimage to Washington to ask 
that Canada be exempted from the surcharge. This the Americans 
refused outright. Second, the Canadian government prepared to 
offe>- support to Canadian industries affected by the surcharge in 
1*+ the form of the employment Support Bill. Third, the government 
-simply out-waited the United states until the surcharge was 
dropped on December lb, 1971, without having to negotiate changes 
in the Automobile Agreement. The government was able to resist the 
For a description of the events on and after August 1^ >, 
1971 see "The Week of the Great Ultimatum", Maclean's Magazine, 
Vol. 85, no. *>, March 1972. 
Canada, house of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, September 13, 
14, lb, and 16,1971). The bill allowed tax deferrments and exemptions 
from tax to companies resident in Canada which were adversely affected 
by the surcharge with a view to keepinp- the products of such companies 
competitive in the United States market. 
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ovoral I pr<*Rvure to change the Agreement without making trade 
roncesfiionr, bu'. by so doinp it strengthened the American resolv» 
•o explore other ways by which the same end could be achieved. The 
American government has effectively circumvented the Automobile Agree-
15 
ment by mesne, of the "DISC" program which has already been mentioned. 
The response of the Canadian government, namely: the budget 
of May 8, 197?, indicates that this is the case. The government 
offered tax concessions to all manufacturers including the automobile 
manufacturers just as the American "DISC" program was offered to all 
Urited states-based industries "including the automobile industry. If 
the "DTSC" program had no potential of circumventing fhe Automobile 
Agreement presumably the American government would not have offered 
it to the automobile manufacturers as a method of rebuilding the 
United States surplus in trode in automobiles with Canada. By the 
sam" token the Canadian government would not have included Canadian 
automobile manufacturers in its budget incentives program if the 
government felt that the "DISC" program did not have the potential 
to circumvent the Agreement as it applies to th^se Canadian manufacturers. 
The United States government wants to change it.s overall trading-
relationship with Canada in a way which is favourable to th** United 
States. The Automobile Agreement is an obstacle to the achievement of 
the kind of trading arrangement the United States wants with Canada. 
In this sense, the Canadian government's overall bargaining position 
with regard to trade matters is undercut to the point where Canada is 
Jean-Luc Pep->n, The Ottawa Journal, April 29, 197?. 
limited to r^i-t^n" to Ar.eri<-an initiatives to change the status quo. 
Obviously, the future of the Automobile Agreement itself i <* suspect 
under such ri re Jirstancer ind it is unlikely that, the presentation of 
If 
v +»*ade rtatist cs by the Canadian /ovrnmf nt with -egard to 
automobile production is likely to sway the thinkinr ">f the American 
p-'vernmen^ toward e^p-ardinp; the Agreement as anything but -j bad deal 
f T them. 
^he pressure of the Canadian government to change its t^de 
relationship with the United States toward free trade is increased 
rather than lessened by bilateral trade arrangements such as the 
Automobile Agreement when the United Ftates turns inward to shore up 
i+s economy. Tt is quite l^k^ly that the Onadian government can 
only counter move just ro far until it is faced with the choice of 
changing the Automobile Agreement in ways favouring the United jtat*»s 
or chanp-inf r'anada,r- overall trading relationship with the United States. 
The Canadian p-overnment would prefer to do neither, but this is the 
least likely possibility of all. 
The Automobile Agreement does, however, bring into the open 
the basic dilemma as to whether Canada shouLd pursue an increasingly 
integrated trade and economic rclationshio with the United States or 
whether Canada should be attempting to make basic changes in the 
relationship •oward increased Canadian autonomy. Bv bringing the 
dilemma into the open, the political decisions made in the pursuit of 
either course become at the same time more critical and more subject 
C .E . neigie, op.ci.t. , p. 87. 
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to debite bpciuae of fhe °xn' rience gained from what I vould call 
bilateral experiments like the Automobile Agreement. 
A further consequence faced by the Canadian government is 
the decline of its influence on the automobile industry which has 
come about as a result of the Automobile Agreement. Prior to 1%5 
( ->nadians purchased 7.5 percent of the automobiles produced in 
\'orth America yearly, while Canadians manufactured k.b percent of 
17 the tot^l number of cars put on the North American market each year. 
The Canadian government felt that the Automobile Agreement and 
particularly the production-to-sales ratio would narrow this gap an^ 
attain what has been called n "fiir and equitable" share of North 
A-nerican automobile production. What has happened is that the gap 
mentioned above has narrowed slighfy. Canadian? continue to purchase 
7.S percent of th° automobiles produced in North Imer-' ra, and Canada 
n-<w manufactures 5 percent of the total North American output of 
automobiles. Production decisions regarding the number and types 
of models manufactured in Canada aro now rmde virtually exclusively 
in the United States; and the American government wants a new trading 
arrangement. Thus, the Canadian government, through the Automobile j 
* 
l 
Agreement, has not only given up its influenre over automobile 
production in this country, but has also provoked American dis-
satisfaction with regard to its trade relations with Canada. 
/The Canadian government has lost its direct influence over 
17W.J. Patrick interview, February 11, 197?. 
18..., 
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the automobile industrv in this country because since l<)bb the 
industry has been prompted to function as a North ^moricnn entity 
with locus of decision-makinp for that entity moving increasingly 
*o the United States. The economic benefits accruing to the auto-
mobile industry, as a result of this shift, are apparent. There 
arr- ,-Jt the same time, however, political shortcomings. Production 
decisions which originate in the United States for the automobile 
industry in Canada deny the validity of promoting, by political 
19 
me^ns, Canadian ownership of Canadian business, and of removing 
export limitations imposed on Canadian subsidiary operations, not to 
mention the development of Canadian manarers of international business 
as well as scientific, engineering and technical support personnel in 
•such business. These elements are indiepensible in the development 
of a Canadian industrial strategy which serves Canada's political 
and long term economic interests. 
As production in the automobile industry has become integrated 
to a North American context the north-south flow of commerce between 
Canada and the United States has been reinforced at the expense of 
Canada's pattern of national integration established on an east-west 
basis of commercial flow. At the same time, integration in the 
automobile industry has brought about the demand by the United States 
leadership of the international automobile workers union that its 
l.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 6|?. The percentage of foreign 
ownership of Ford of Canada has increased since 1965• Litvak 
notes that in 1964 Ford-Canada was a 7^ .9 percent owned subsidiary 
of Ford Motor Company Incorporated (ie. Ford-U.S.). In 1969 this 
percentage had increased to 8l percent ownership by Ford-U.S. The 
other 19 percent of Ford-Canada is owned in Canada. 
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Canadian membership should be paid wages on a par with those of the 
American membership and which are adjusted to American tax and 
monetary conditions. Neither of the^e phenomena are in Canada's 
political, interest since they do not lend themselves to the develop-
ment of appropriate Canauian wage policies and independent tax and 
monetary policies, but it seems clear that these objectives will 
not be realized in the automobile industry in this country during 
the life of the Automobile Agreement in its present form. The 
Canadian government cannot effectively implement economic policies 
which T P designed to achieve political interests of the kind 
mentioned above f>c Jong as the production decisions for the automobile 
industry in Canada are made outside this country. 
°omp Canadian automobile workers have become much more 
nationalistic as a result of the Agreement. As mentioned above, n 
r""oi'p of Canadian automobile workers headed by Larry Haiven of 
Windsor, Ontarao have called for the separation of the Canadian UAW 
*>om the United States-based international nAW. Mr. fiaiven's group, 
the "Canadians to f^olirh the HAW Autopact Committee", hap also 
20 
cilied for the abrogation of the Agreement itself. Dennis 
M;0f»rrott, Canadian president of the UAW, is sympathetic with Mr. 
Haivc's position although he is not as forthright. Mr. MrDermott 
has called for increased autonomy for the Canadian 'JAW in response 
to the assertions by +h" American president of the UAW internationnl 
union, Leonard Woodcock, that the United States membership sees the 
Larry Haivon, The Windsor Star, June ?b, 1972. 
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Agrpp-TPnt as the means to protect the job^ of its United States 
rembership. 
I', has been mentioned above that the Canadian automobile 
manufacturers are now ahl«* to meet the rovernmen*'s value-added 
'••affifruard through payrolls and inventories alone with the result 
+ *-,->*- nart^ for new cars may be brought into Canada duty free. As 
a result, the parent f •* rms of the Canadian automobile manufacturers 
now can supply virtually all the parts which their subsidiaries 
require from plants operating in the United States. Another result 
is that the Canadian parts manufacturers have increased difficulty 
of access to the American market because of the American industry's 
preference to buy parts "in house" and because the Canadian parts 
producers cannot achieve a volume of production sufficient to compete 
with their American counterparts. The net effect is that the parts 
manufacturers are being forced out of business at worst, or are 
havinp to curtail their operations at best. 
As mentioned above A. D. Hales, the Progressive Conservative 
critic in the House of Commons, cited the case of Inpersoll Machine 
and Tool which was forced out of business because i t could not 
compete in the United States automotive parts market after the 
22 
Automobile Agreement came into effect in 1965* A.J. Wallace 
informed me that Earl Wobinson Auto Parts of Oshawa had lost about 
?iDennis McDermott, The Windsor Star, June 27, 1972. 
?? 
A.D. Ha1es, Remarks to the Progressive Conservatiye 
Caucus Committee on^Industry (Ottawa, March 26, 1965). 
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one-fhi"d of its business as a result of the automobile manufacturers• 
d*"-j si or- to shift the source of supply of these parts to the United 
23 
r
"tat»s after the Agreement rame into effect. An example of the 
fact that the automotive parts industry generally in Canada has not 
been expanding is that capital expenditures for repairs and expansion 
2k 
have declined in the industry since the Agreement came into effect. 
Because the automobile industry has lived up fully to the provisions 
of the Automobile Agreement, the Canadian government cannot provide 
direct heir to th° parts rranufacturers in this country. 
T4 has TI ready been mentioned (see Chapter ITJ) that the value 
of -automotive parts exports f^om Canada has increased, at the same 
time, however, +he import of automotive parts to Canada has increased 
pvpn more drastically and it appears that it will be the large 
Canadian subsidiaries of United States-based automotive parts firms 
«=u<~h as Kelsey-Hayes of Windsor and Budd Automotive of Kitchener, 
2b 
which wiLI reap the greatest share of these benefits. 
It should not be inferred from the above discussion that Canada 
is powerless to do anything about the position in which it finds itself 
because of the Agreement. The government has offered tax concessions 
23 
Wallace In t e rv i ew, August 12, 1971. 
2k 
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics* 6l-20r>, Capital 
and Repair Expenditures (Ottawa, May, 1971)• The capital 
expenditures amounted to ft 88.9 million in 1965 and in 1969 these 
same expenditures amounted to ft 79-6 million. 
1968. 
2b 
"Report on Business", Toronto Globe and Mail, May 20, 
] 
to all the manufacturing industries including the automobile industry 
throurh the budget speech of Miy 8, 1972, in the hope that possible 
reductions in automobile production as a result of the United States 
"DISC" Drogram will be offset in this country by the tax inducements 
announced by Mr. Turner. The government should be fully prepared 
to see another initiative similar to "DISC" introduced by the United 
.States government if the Canadian tax concessions are successful in 
rnaintaJnine automobile production in Canada and exports to the United 
states at their present levels. 
The Canadian government has offered Regional Incentive Grants 
to Canadian parts manufacturers, but this response would seem to be 
of limited value since the American government has threatened to 
apply countervailing duties arguing that the Canadian government's 
incentive program gives Canadian producers an unfair advantage in 
competing with American producers in the United States market. The 
United States government has recently made such a response in the 
case of the French-owned Michelin Tire Company of Nova Scotia, a 
company which has been suosidized by jrrants of money from the 
Canadian Department of Regional Economic Expansion. The Michelin 
Company has been granted what the American government has called an 
"unfair competitive advantage" when the company exports tires to the 
United States market." 
The Canadian government's response to its loss of influence 
on the automobile industry as a whole is likely to be successful in 
See the comments of John Petty, Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury, The Ottawa Journal, April 29, 1972. 
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the short term only. The United States is determined that the 
Automobile p^reernent, which it believes has brought about an 
unsatisfactory trade arrangement, must be altered. In the long 
term, Canada would seem to have two choices with regard to the 
Automobile Agreement, nameiy: change the treaty in a mutually 
.-icceptable way; or abrogate the treaty entirely. 
The Canadian government has talked about changing the 
Agreement in terms of expanding it to include other items such as 
tires which were not included in the original Agreement, while the 
27 
Agreement as it presently stands would remain the same. The 
United States government is less vague about the way in which it 
would change the Agreement. The Americans want the Canadian safe-" 
guards to be removed and thev want the private Canadian consumer, asj 
well as Canadian manufacturers and retailers, to be able to import 
automobiles from the United States, Given this fundamental 
difference, the only other option which appears open to the Canadian 
government is the abrogation of the Agreement. Whichever course the 
Canadian government chooses to follow, the economic and political 
effects are bound to be serious. 
The Canadian government negotiated the Automobile Agreement
 t 
with a view to eliminating the gap between production and sales of 
automobiles in the North American market. The Automobile Agreement 
27 
C.E. Beigie, op.cit., pp. 123-138. The interviews with 
D.C. Thorn and Bert Barr confirmed that this is the kind of change 
which the puolic service would recommend to the government. 
?R 
United States Congress, senate Committee on Finance, 
hearings (Washington, September ik i^ « 16, 20 and 21, 1965), 
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has from tp« beginning, hem -> modified fro*1 trade ap-eement wr4-' 
is contingent on special "omtri t.ments (i.e. the safrpjards) from the 
autnmobi'p industry to the Can^d'in government. The Agreement har 
narrowed .-slightly the gap between production and sales, but has nit 
<• ' -,",-< iated it. Consideration must be given to the consequence 
oF the Canadian government dropping the safeguards in ordT to 
maintain the Agreement. 
The government of rici n i ^  .vith whom I spoke were in concert 
in this regard. D.C Thnm nii: "foreign competition would be wide 
open in Canada, *" T"j *-ion of the entirp industry would ensue". 
He made i*- "i»=ir that the disruption could be so extensive as to 
reduce the automobile manufacturing industry in Canada to a series 
of di«*tn h- f* n« warehouses for automobiles which are produced in 
other countries. No Canadian government could easily overcome the 
economic impact of having a major reverue rource so decimated. Ry 
the same token, the automohile industry is also of key importing 
because of the capital it generates and disperses. vet, if the 
production rafeguards were dropped, these functions of the automobile 
industry in Canada would be severely cut if not entirely eliminated. 
Further, no Canadian government would want to risk throwing more 
than 80,000 Canadians employed in automobile manufacturing out of 
work when a chronic unemployment rate of 6 percent is already a 
political issue while these workers are employed. 
W.J. Patrick Interview, February 11, 1972. 
Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971• 
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Bert Harr acknowledged that if there is to be a Canada-
U-n ted ntatep ^itomobile Agreement there "have to be s^fesruards to \ 
control production and employment in Camda." He agreed with 
Mr. Thorn that ^ Automobile Agreement without safeguards would 
H«»fini tely he economically disastrous for f'anada and that economic 
effects would bring about political repercussions. 
It i<* my opinion that these repercussions would involve the 
overall relationship between Canada and the United States rather 
than the defeat of a Canadian government at the polls as a result 
of having dropped the safeguards. The latter possibility is, \ 
however, far from being beyond the realm of possibility. Canada's j 
maintenance of the safeguards to date represents this country's j 
unwillingness to permit the level of automobile manufacturing here 
to be determined solely on decisions made in American head offices. 
ft th» same time, the safeguards militate against the possibility 
tHat the United States parent automotive firms might distort derisions 
based on market forces to raise production beyond what the market 
could actually support. Tn a noli tical climate where nationalist 
opinion such as expressed by the Waffle, and the Committee for an 
Independent Canada is so intense, it is unlikely that any government 
could survive maintaining th» Agreement without the kind of protection 
mentioned above. 
Tt is my view that the Automobile Agreement is likely to 
have direct and immediate political repercussions only if a Canadian 
government ailowed the Agreement to evolve into a free trade arrangement 
Parr Interview, August 3, 1971. 
1?1 
;n -tutomob: lo trade faptwen Omada and the United states. Given 
"i Fon.-niiR and effective criticism of Riich a" -irranp-ement by a 
viable, alternative opposition party, it is birhly probable that 
•i r«nervil pU'f-l ini rn'i I d b" forced on n^^ an issue and that the 
rovernmen* which inifTted rnrh a nroprif could be voted out of 
'. ffir-e. The experience of the Liberal government of Wilfrid Laurier 
in L911 myy be used as ar indicator of the prospects for a Canadian 
p-ovprnment which advocates free trade with the U^it^i States. 
As a partial free trade arrangement the Automobile Agreement 
has been ^nbi»ct to relatively little criticism, especially with 
regard to its political implications. The rriticiRm of Conrervative 
A. D. H'<les on just these grounds has been muted by the automobile 
industry in this country while the Agreement has been effect. As a 
result, the Conservative party no longer argues for the abrogation of 
the Agreement. Instead, the Conservative party has become n voice 
foi- the Caradian automotive parts manufacturers who have suffered 
a result of the A freemen t. The Conservatives have there for*1 be 
implicit supporters of the Agreement and the introduction of the 
Transitional Ad]ustment Benefits scheme for parts manufacturers by 
the Liberol p-overnment is an effective and disarming political 
response to the cri'icism by the Conservatives. 
The defeat of the Laurier government by Robert Borden and 
the Conservatives was due in large part to the advocacy of free 
trade with the United states by the Liberal party. See. J.M.S. Careless, 
The Canadians: i867 - 196? 'Toronto* 196V). 
THles Interview, February l8, 1971. 
Neither has the N»w Democractic *"arty criticized the Agrae<^ 
m~n + on the basis of its political effects or because of the way 
it inhibits the potential, development of a Canadian industrial 
strategy. The T.A.B. funds were also made available to automobile 
workers who suffered dislocation is a result of the Agreement and 
thereby defused the original criticism of the Agreement of the 
New Democratic Party spokesman Reid Scott. Kdward Broadbent, who 
is Mr. Scott's successor as the New Democratic Party critic of the 
Agreement, has affiled for a strengthening of the production safeguards 
wriich are attached to the Agreement. Since most of Mr. Broadbent's 
constituents (in Oshawa-Whitby) are employed in the automotive 
industry, it would be difficult for him to argue for the abrogation 
of a trade ar^nperaent which has increased employment among his 
electors. Mr. Broadbent's arguments do indicate an implicit 
recognition by him tnat the safeguards are the only guarantee that 
Canada has that automobile manufacturing will continue in this country 
35 
while the Agreement is in effect. " 
The economic benefits realized by the automobile industry 
through the Agreement, combined with the effective muting by the 
liberal government, of such political opposition to the Agreement 
as did arise, have effectively overshadowed criticism which ir based 
on Canada's lonp term political interests or on the need for the 
Canadian government to develop an industrial strategy which encourages 
3^ 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates ("Ottawa, Apr i l 2^ , 1972) , 
p . 1680. 
It should be noted that Mr. Broadbent's position is more to 
the left than that taken by some of his colleagues in the N.D.P. on 
trade matters. See Max Saltsman in Abraham Rotstein (ed.) 
An Industrial Strategy for Canada (Toronto, 19 7?K 
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the full utilization of Canada's human resources. 
Opposition critics of the Agreement in the House of Commons, 
government officials, and spokesmen in the public service are opposed 
in general, to a free trade arrangement in automobiles and parts with 
the United States. The American administration is equally determined 
that free trade in automobiles and parts will replace the present 
Automobile Agreement. Given this choice the Canadian government's 
best choice would seem to be the abrogation of the Agreement to help 
ensure the automobile oroduction is continued in this country rather 
than just the distribution of automobiles. In choosing this alternative 
the government will have taken a step toward maintaining the viability 
of Canada's political nationality and at the same time such a decision 
n-ay well provide the government with the opportunity to embark on the 
development of a Canadian industrial strategy which is designed in 
Canada to meet Canadian requirements. 
The Automobile Agreement is instructive to the Canadian 
government in two wnys. First, the Agreement demonstrates that 
rationalization in a sector of industry can be carried out at the 
encouragement of the government. The rationalization process can 
bring about the long range development of a particular industry in 
Canada more readily if the process is carried out within Canada 
according to Canadian political and economic needs. Second, the 
Agreement points out that a bilateral trade agreement made between 
Canada and the United States which is restricted to a particular 
industry sector tends to limit the Canadian government's influence 
on that sector of industry, particularly when that sector of industry 
^ 
operates as wholly owned subsidiaries of United States-based 
operations. 
Prior to the signing of the Automobile Agreement in 1965. 
the Canadian automobile industry was a replica in miniature of the 
United States automobile industry. The Automobile Agreement does 
give the Canadian automobile industry access to the United States 
automobile market, but the Canadian industry itself has been ration-
alized in such a way that it can only prow according to the North 
American demand for the automobiles manufactured in Canada, rather 
than developing •according to the Canadian demand and taste for 
snecific automobile models which could be produced in this country. 
The long-term development of Canada is not served by the Automobile 
Agreement which intef-rates the Canadian demand and taste in auto-
mobiles to North American standards set in the United States beyond 
the direct influence of the Canadian people. 
The automobile industry in both Canada and the United states 
is the chief supporter of the Automobile Agreement which encourages 
a more integrated North Amoricar automobile industry. The irdur.try 
supports the Agreement because the Canadian industry is integrated 
in a more economical North /m^riran <^-heme of production. 
The Canadian political assessment of the Automobile Agreement 
is that it is successful and worthwhile because the efficiency of the 
automobile industry in Canada has increased, the number of Canadians 
employed in the industry has risen slightly, and the deficit in 
Canada's automobile trade balance with the United States has been 
reduced rlightly. On the othe** hand, production decisions and taste 
J 
formation is not directly subject to Canadian requirements, Canadian 
workers through their international union leadership have demanded 
wage parity and job security with their American counterparts, and 
Canada has found that the United States objects to the continuation 
of the Agreement because the Canadian trade deficit in automobiles 
has been reduced although not eliminated. The Canadian production 
"safeguards" have contributed to each of these situations, but more 
important, the safeguards encourage only the growth rather than the 
development of the Canadian automobile industry according to the 
growth overall in North America of the automobile industry. 
The United States political assessment of the Automobile 
Agreement is one of dissatisfaction. The United States government 
would prefer a free trade agreement in the automobile industry in 
Canada. The production "safeguards" in the Agreement have aroused 
American ire because these prevent free trade which the United States 
seems to think it was bargaining for in 196i> and because the "safe-
guards" have reduced the American surplus in automobile trade with 
Canada. It seems to me that the main reason the United States has not 
moved directly to abrogate the Automobile Agreement is the influence 
of the American automobile industry, which, as I have pointed out, 
is fully satisfied with the Agreement. 
Canada and the United States have not yet altered the 
Automobile Agreement via normal negotiations. Instead, the United 
States has initiated a series of trade measures which do not put 
direct pressure on the Automobile Agreement, but which do attempt to 
elicit trade concessions from Canada. The Canadian government has 
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responded to the United States' ten percent surcharge on imports and 
"DISC1 programs, not by altering or ending the Automobile Agreement 
which is what the United States seems to want, but rather by subsidizing 
the operation of Canadian industry in the United States market through 
the Employment Support Bill and through the tax incentives provided 
for the industry in the May 1972 budget. 
The Canadian government found that the rationalization of 
the automobile industry in this country on a North American basis 
has meant that this country purchases 7»5 percent of the overall 
North American automobile production just as was the case prior to 
I965. The Canadian automobile industry now meets 5 percent of that 
demand compared to ^ .5 percent before the Automobile Agreement came 
into effect. The Canadian government should learn that the United 
States government is interested in trade arrangements such as the 
Automobile Agreement to the extent that the latter feels a surplus 
in trade cot'ld be maintained or increased by such an arrangement. 
The chances of the United States achieving a trade surplus are, 
it seems to me, dramatically improved when a free trade arrangement 
is negotiated in an industry sector which has American-based parent 
companies. 
The Automobile Agreement i6 like any other policy that is 
developed in that the actual policy in its working form does not 
distinguish between what the policymakers intended and what the 
output of the policy process actually turns out to be. On the basis 
of the evidence which I have examined, I submit that the output of the 
Automobile Agreement undermines the val-'ditv of those non-economic 
motivations which I have defined as Canada's political interests. 
Furthermore, the output of the Automobile Agreement, to the extent 
that it inhibits the development of a Canadian industrial strategy 
"imilar in kind to the one mentioned above, denies Canadians the 
freedom to set their own priorities. 
The Automobile Agreement serves further to entrench automobile 
production and consumer taste for automobiles on a north-south axis 
and in a North American context. The reluctance of Canadian automobile 
manufacturers to serve certain markets, because these markets are 
legally unavailable to their American parent firms, is reinforced 
rather than discouraged by the Agreement. The Agreement therefore 
restricts Canadian international trade and vicariously Canadian foreign 
relations. A further result of the Automobile Agreement is the demand 
for wage parity by the automobile workers union. Such a demand does 
not allow for the development of appropriate Canadian wage and social 
security policies in the automobile industry in Canada as long as the 
Agreement which was the catalyst for this demand, remains in existence. 
As a result of the integrative nature of the Automobile Agreement, it 
seems likely that a pricing policy will be developed within the auto-
mobile industry for all of North America, there is as yet no direct 
evidence of this phenomenon, which does not adhere directly to 
Canadian tax and monetary policies. I contend that none of these 
outputs of the Automobile Agreement are in Canada's long term poiiticai 
interest. 
As a result of the Automobile Agreement, the locus of 
decision-making for the Canadian automobile is more than ever based 
in the United States. This result of the Agreement restricts the 
development of Canadian management skills within the automobile 
industry in Canada. As a result of the Agreement, research and 
development in the automobile industry has moved exclusively to the 
United States which clearly retards the development of Canadian 
engineering, technical, and scientific personnel engaged in research 
and development within the automobile industry in this country. 
The Automobile Agreement has not promoted Canadian participation in 
the ownership of the Canadian automobile industry, nor was it the 
intention of the Agreement to do so. Nor has the existence of the 
Automobile Agreement had any affect on the export limitations which 
continue to apply to the Canadian automobile industry. The net 
output of the Automobile Agreement is to move the thrust of Canadian 
policy away from, rather than toward, the maximum development of 
Canadian human and industrial resources as integral facets of a 
Canadian industrial strategy. 
After the Presidential election in the United States in 
November, 1972, and after the general election which is expected in 
Canada in 1972, there will likely be drastic changes made in the 
Automobile Agreement. I agree with Mr. Barr that the present safe-
guards are going to be dropped, and the most likely mutually 
convenient time is immediately after an election in each country. 
garr Interview, August 3» 1971. 
.-ovli«»d tfnt the government of each country has a strong mandate 
with which t.n negotiate. Unlike Mr. Barr, T cannot see how replace-
ment safeguards can be impJemented which would at the same time 
guarantee C-ir>'idian control over automobile production and a favou^abl^ 
bqlani-e of t.radp position for the United States with regard to North 
American automobile production. It is a distinct possibility then 
that by 197^ the Automobile Agreement will be abrogated despite 
D.C. Thorn's statement that this eventuality is "inconceivable without 
some kind of replacement"' in view of the speoiali7ntion which has 
occurred in the Canadian segment of the industry and in view of the 
reappiicable tariff, 'i'here is no doubt that the abrogation of the 
Automobile Agreement would bring about political and economic changes 
and even dislocation, but T do not believe these effects would be 
permanent nor do they necessarily need to be disastrous. 
The abrogation of the Automobile Agreement would leave the 
automobile industry, eventually, about in the position it was in 
196^, except that the industry is much more specialized. The govern-
ment would do well to encourage and perpetuate the kind of special-
ization which has developed in the automobile industry in Canadr, 
For example, American Motors now produces seven automobile models 
in Canada, compared to the twenty-one models it manufactured ir 
Canada prior to ^ o S . There will be no need for a national 
publicly-ewned automobile company in Canada as long as th^ automobile 
industry which presently operates in Canada is able to meet and 
"*7 
' One year's notice is required if either country wishes to 
abrogate the Agreement, see the Appendix. 
Thorn Interview, August 3i 1971. 
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specialize in whnt seems to be the Canadian preference for compact 
grd middle-si 7.« automobiles. Tn this way, the Automobile Agreement 
could reach its most fruitful conclusion in Canada. On the other 
l.Tid, the government may wish to apply some or all of the recommend-
ations of the Pladen commission to the Canadian automobile industry 
ro as to attempt to expand the industry by "making removal of the 
39 tariff on imports conditional upon export performance", as 
Dean Bladen suggested. 
The development of the automobile industry suggests a course 
of action which the Canadian government should undertake not only on 
behalf of the automobile industry, but on behalf of all industry in 
Canada in order to ensure that all industry in Canada is responsive 
to Canadian needs. The government should require full financial 
disclosure of all Canadian operations including foreign controlled 
corporate entities. Further, the Canadian government should ensure 
that fulL cost pricing, both in and out, is required in all Canadian 
r.ubridinp operations so that the parent firm is made aware that it 
is doing business in a foreign country and so that greater financial 
autonomy and the promotion of Canadian equity becomes a feature of 
such operations. The government should direct that Canadians be 
made members of the boards of directors of all industry operating 
in Canada and that some of these people should not otherwise be 
associated with the particular company on whose board they serve. 
The Canadian government should order the liberalization of tax 
laws to facilitate the training of Canadian managerial personnel 
39 
C.E. Beigie, op.cit., p. 39. 
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who will serve in Canada upon the completion of their training, 
particularly in international business operations. Finally, the 
Canadian government, in concert with other countries which 
experience similar difficulties, should order that all foreign-
owned subpidiaries should be required to abide by Canadian law 
and policy, whenever these Laws 'ire in conflict with the law, 
policy ana financial disclosure requirements of the country of 
the parent fi^m. 
If the Automobile Agreement leads to action of this type 
by the Canadian government, Canada's future economic and political 
requirements are more likely to be achieved according to Canadian 
specifications. Perhaps the most fruitful outcome of the Automobile 
'p-r^ement would be the realization by the Canadian government and by 
the Canadian nublic that the viability of Canada's political 
nationality is at least as important as the economic well-being 
of Canada's cornorate citizens and that those considerations should 
be viewed as being complementary to each other. 
1PPFNDTX A 
AGREEMENT CONCERNTNG AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS 
BETWEEN ^HE COVFRNMENT AN^ TH*" TTNITED STATES OF <VMERICA 
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 
The Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Ganada, 
Determined to st-engthen t^ c economic relations between 
their two countries; 
Recognizing that this can best be irhieved through the 
stimulation of economic growth ind through the expansion of markets 
available to producers in both countries within the fran^work of 
the established policy of both countries of promoting multilateral 
trade; 
Recognizing that an expansion of trade cm hest be achieved 
throvgh the reduction or elimirntior of tariff and all o^ -he** barriers 
to trade ope*v:ting *o impede or distort the full and efficient 
development of each country's trade and industrial potenti.-l; 
"ecognizing the important place that the automotive 
industry occupies in the industrial economy of the two countries 
and the interests of industry, labor and consumers in sustaining 
high levels of efficient production and continued growth in the 
automotive industry; 
Agree as follows: 
Article I 
The Governments of the United States -and Canada, pursuant 
to the above principles, shall seek the early achievement of the 
following objectives: 
(a) The creation of a broader market for automotive 
products within which the fuLl benefits of rpTialnzation and 
1 ">rge-scale production can be achieved; 
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(b) The liberalization of United States and Canadian 
automotive trade in respect of tariff barriers and other 
f-ictors tending to impede it, with a view to enabling the 
industries of both countries to participate on a fair and 
equitabie basis in the expanding total market of the two 
countri es; 
(c) The development of conditions in which market forces 
may operate effectively to attain the most economic pattern 
of investment, production and trade. 
Tt sh^Jl be the policy of each Government to avoid 
actionw which would frustrate the achievement of these objectives. 
Article II 
(a) The Government of Canada, not later than the entry into 
force of the legislation contemplated in paragraph (b) of this 
Article, shall accord duty-free treatment to imports and products of 
the United States described in Annex A. 
(b) The Government of the United States, during the session 
of the United States Congress commencing on January k, 196% shall 
seek enactment of legislation authorizing duty-free treatment of 
imports of the products of Canada described in Annex B. In sepkinfc 
ruch legislation, the Government of the United States shall also seek 
authority permitting the implementation of such duty-free treatment 
retroactively to the earliest date administratively possible 
following the date upon which the Government of Canada has accorded 
duty-free treatment. Promptly after the entry into force of such 
legislation, the Government of the Urited States shall accord duty-
free treatment to the products of Canada described in Annex B. 
Article ITT 
Th° commitments made by the two Governments in this Agree-
ment shall not preclude action by either Government consistent with 
its obligations under Po-t TI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade. 
Article TV 
(a) At any time, at the request of either Government, the 
two Government shall consult with respect to any matter relating to 
this Apreement. 
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(b) Without Limiting the foregoing, the two Governments 
shalL, at the request of either Government, consult with respect 
to any problems which may arise concerning automotive producers 
in the United States which do not at present have facilities in 
Canada for the manufacture of motor vehicles, and with respect to 
the implications for the operation of this Agreement of new auto-
motive producers becoming established in Canada. 
(c) No later than January 1, 1968, the two Governments 
shall jointly undertake a comprehensive review of the progress 
made towards achieving the objectives set forth in Article I. 
During this review the Governments shall consider such further 
steps as may be necessary to desirable for the full achievement 
of these ab.jectives. 
Article V 
Access to the United States and Canadian markets provided 
for under this Agreement may by agreement be accorded on similar 
t^rms to other countries. 
Article VI 
This Agreement shall enter into force provisionally on the 
date of signature and definitively on the date upon which notes are 
exchanged between the two Governments giving notice that appropriate 
action in their respective legislatures has been completed. 
Article VII 
This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration. Each 
Government shall however have the right to terminate this Agreement 
twelve months from the date on which that Government gives written 
notice to the other Government of its intention to terminate the 
Agreement. 
In witness whereof the representatives of the two Governments 
have signed this Agreement. 
Done in duplicate at Johnson City, Texas, this lbth day of 
January 1965, in English and French, the two texts being equally 
authentic. 
For the Government of the United States of America: 
For the Government of Canada:-
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Annex A 
(i) Automobiles; when imported by a manufacturer of automobiles. 
(?) All parts, and accessories and parts thereof, except tires 
and tubes, when imported for use as original equipment in 
automobiles to be produced in Canada by a manufacturer of 
automobiles. 
(3) Buses, when imported by a manufacturer of buses. 
(M All parts, and accessories and parts thereof, except tires 
and tubes, when imported for use as original equipment in 
buses to be produced in Canada by a manufacturer of buses. 
(5) Specified commercial vehicles, when imported by a manu-
facturer of specified commercial vehicles. 
(6) All parts, and accessories and parts thereof, except tires, 
tubes and any machines or other articles required under 
Canadian tariff item k'j>8a to be valued separately under the 
tariff items regularly applicable thereto, when imported 
for use as original equipment in specified commercial vehicles 
to produced in Canada by a manufacturer of specified commercial 
vehicles. 
(1) "Automobile" means a four-wheeled passenger automobile having 
a seating capacity for not more than ten persons; 
(?) "Base year" means the period of twelve months commencing on 
the 1st day of Aupust, 1963 and ending on the 31st day of 
July, 1964; 
(3) "Bus" means a passenger motor vehicle havinp a seating capacity 
for more than 10 persons, or a chassis therefor, but does not 
include any following vehicle or chassis therefor, namely an 
electric trackless trolley bus, amphibious vehicle, tracked or 
half-tracked vehicle or motor vehicle designed primarily for 
off-highway use; 
(k) "Canadian value added" has the meaning assigned by regulations 
made under section 275 of the Canadian Customs Act; 
(b) "Manufacturer" of vehicles of any following class, namely 
automobiles, buses or specified commercial vehicles, means, in 
relation to any importation of goods in respect of which the 
description is relevant, a manufacturer that 
1 * 
(i) produced vehicles of that class in Canada in each of 
the four consecutive three month*-' periods is the base 
year, and 
(n) product vehicles <-><" that rlass in Canada in the period 
of twelve months ending on the 31st da^ <-,<" July in which 
the importation is made, 
'A) the "atio o*" +vie net sales value of which to the net 
sales va^ue of all vehicles of that class sold for 
consumption in Canada by the manufacture** in that 
period is equal to or higher than the ratio of the 
net sales value of all vehicles of that class produced 
in Canada by the manufacturer in the base y^ar to the 
net sales value of all vehicles of that class -sold for 
consumption in Canada by the manufacturer in the base 
year, and is not ir any case lower than seventy-five 
to one hundred; and 
(B) the Canadian value added of which is equsi to or 
greater than the Canadian value --*dded of all vehicles 
o
r
 that "lass produced in Canada by the manufacturer 
in the base year; 
C6) "Net saLes value" has the meaning assigned by regulations made 
under section 273 of the Canadian Customs Act; and 
(7) "Tpocified commercial vehicle" m^ans a motor tru<-k, motor 
truck chassis, ambulance or chassis thei-for hearse or chassis 
therefo^, but does not include: 
(a) n^ y following vehicle or a chassis designed primarily 
therefor, namely a bus, electric trackless troLley bus, 
amphibious vehicle, tracked or half-tracked vehicle, 
goLf or invalid cart, straddle carrier, motor vehicle 
designed primariLy for off-highway use or motor vehicle 
specially constructed and equipped to perform special 
services or functions, such as, but not limited to, a 
fire engine, mobile crane, wrecker, concrete mixer or 
mobile cliric, or 
(b) r.n-j machine or other article required under Canadian 
tariff item 438a to be valued separately under the 
tariff item regularly applicable thereto. 
3. The Government of Canada may designate a manufacturer not falling 
within the categories set out above as being entitled to the benefit 




(J) Motor vehicles for the transport of persons or articles 
as provided for in items 69<->.05 and 692.10 of the Tariff Schedules 
of the United states and chassis therefor, but not including electric 
trolley buses, three-wheeled vehicles, or trailers accompanying 
truck tractors, or charsis therefor. 
(?) Fabricated components, not including trailers, tires, or 
tubes for tires, for use as original equipment in the manufacture 
of motor vehicles of the kinds described in paragraph (1) above, 
(3) Articles of the kinds described in paragraphs (1) and (?) 
above include such articles whether finished or unfinished but do 
not include any article produced with the use of materials imported 
into Canada which are product.*: of any foreign country (pxcept 
materials produced within the customs territory of the United 
States), if the aggregate value of su<~h imported materials when 
landed at the Canadian port of entry, exclusive of any landing 
cost and Canadian duty, was — 
(a) with regard to articles of the kinds described in 
paragraph (1), not including chassis, more than 60 percent 
until January 1, 1968, and thereafter more than 50 percent 
of the appraised customs value of the article imported into 
the customs territory of the United States; and 
(b) with regard to chassis of the kinds described in 
paragraph (l), and articles of the kinds described in para-
graph (?), more than 50 percent of the appraised customs value 
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